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WHY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
GOT SOME (BUT NOT A LOT) OF 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
ANALYSIS RIGHT 
PAULMARCUS 1 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did 
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... 
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilry, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past forty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has 
firmly established the right to lawyers for poor people in criminal cases. 
The right, arising under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, extends beyond trials, and includes assistance in addition to 
lawyers for indigent defendants. The right to a lawyer is seen as central to 
our system of criminal justice. At the same time, the Justices' rulings here 
have been subject to sharp criticism in a host of areas relating to the stages 
of the proceedings to which the right applies, the failure to define 
indigency, and the refusal to monitor seriously the competency of lawyers 
in such cases. 
In this article, I will applaud the reach of some of the Court's 
decisions, but also second the critics who have questioned the limits of 
other decisions. In particular, I will look to the unfortunate determination 
that indigent criminal defendants are not entitled to the assistance of 
counsel in all prosecutions.3 First, though, an overview of how far we have 
come with the right to counsel in criminal cases, in a relatively short period 
of time. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COURT'S COUNSEL DECISIONS 
In its landmark 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,4 the Supreme 
Court held that the 6th Amendment's right to appointed counsel extended 
to indigent criminal defendants in state courts.5 Despite its justly 
celebrated sweeping language and the genuine revolution it created in the 
criminal justice system, Gideon left numerous vital questions unanswered.6 
3. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) . 
.5. !d. at 344-45. 
6. See infra Part IV. 
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Almost a half century later, the Supreme Court continues to grapple with 
defining the scope and application of the 6th Amendment right to counsel.7 
A. GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT 
The Justices in Gideon unanimously incorporated against the states 
the 6th Amendment's right to counsel for indigent defendants.8 Facing a 
felony charge, Gideon appeared in court without funds and without a 
lawyer, and requested that the judge appoint counsel on his behalf. 9 The 
judge denied the request, as Florida only allowed the appointment of 
counsel in capital cases. 10 While "Gideon conducted his defense about as 
well as could be expected from a layman," 11 he was found guilty and 
sentenced to five years imprisonment.12 
Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the 6th Amendment right 
to counsel constituted a fundamental right, and extended that right to 
Gideon and fellow indigent defendants in state criminal proceedings. 13 In 
its opinion, authored by Justice Hugo Black, the Court explicitly overruled 
Betts v. Brady,14 a decision in which Justice Black had strongly dissented.15 
Betts had held that the 6th Amendment right to counsel applied only to 
federal trials, with the notion that "appointment of counsel is not a 
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."16 The Betts Court had 
concluded that neither due process nor the 14th Amendment required the 
states to provide the assistance of defense counsel to indigent defendants 
generally.17 It was needed only in particular cases where special 
circumstances might be present. 18 In sharp contrast to this analysis, Justice 
Black, in dissent, embraced the earlier Powell v. Alabama,19 which had 
declared that the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental 
character.20 In Powell, a shockingly unfair capital case, the Court ruled 
that due process may require the appointment of counsel for certain 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43,352. 
9. !d. at 336-37. 
10. !d. at337. 
11. !d. 
12. /d. 
13. !d. at 345. 
14. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
15. !d. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting). 
16. /d. at 471. 
17. /d. 
18. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 347. 
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
20. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43. 
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indigent defendants.21 Emphasizing Powell, and rejecting Betts as 
precedent, the Court in Gideon found the right to counsel in state as well as 
federal cases to be "fundamental and essential to a fair trial. •>22 
Not only these precedents [Powell v. Alabama] but also reason and 
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for 
him. This seems to be an obvious truth.23 
Despite the sweeping language of Justice Black to grant a 
fundamental right to counsel for indigent defendants, the Gideon holding is 
actually narrow; it left numerous questions unanswered. Indeed, it soon 
became evident that Gideon did not actually extend the right to counsel to 
any indigent criminal defendant "haled into court." 
B . THE ACTUAL IMPRISONMENT STANDARD 
Because Gideon v. Wainwright failed to specify what types of 
prosecutions would qualify for appointed counsel, a decade later, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 6th Amendment right to 
counsel extended only to felony cases. In Argersinger v. Hamlin/4 the 
indigent defendant was denied an appointed lawyer, convicted of carrying a 
concealed weapon, and sentenced to ninety days in jail. 25 He then brought 
a habeas corpus action alleging that he was unconstitutionally deprived of 
the right to counsel at his trial. 26 The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the 
right to counsel only extended to non-petty offenses imposing more than 
six months imprisonmentY The Supreme Court of the United States 
disagreed, deciding that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no 
defendant may be imprisoned for any offense, whether petty, misdemeanor, 
21. The case involved the so-called Scottsboro Boys. As discussed by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals: 
In April 1931, nine black youths were accused of raping two young white women 
while riding a freight train between Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Huntsville, 
Alabama. The case was widely discussed in the local, national, and foreign press. 
The youths were quickly tried in Scottsboro, Alabama, and all were found guilty and 
sentenced to death. 
Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1229 (6th Cir. 1981). Street itself is a most 
interesting case, involving an unsuccessful defamation action brought years later by one of the 
alleged victims in the original rape trial. !d. The suit was against NBC for making a movie 
dramatizing the courage of one of the trial judges in the initial case. !d. 
22. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
23. !d. 
24. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
25. !d. at 26. 
26. /d. 
27. ld. at 26-27. 
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or felony, without representation by counsel at trial.28 Justice Douglas, 
writing for the majority, distinguished the six-month nummum 
imprisonment standard governing the 6th Amendment right to a jury trial 
from the standard to be used with the 6th Amendment right to counsel.29 
Justice Douglas acknowledged that both Gideon and Powell involved 
felonies, but also that both cases "suggest that there are certain fundamental 
rights applicable to all such criminal prosecutions," in order to guarantee a 
fair trial "where an accused is deprived of his liberty. "30 By extending the 
right to counsel to all prosecutions resulting in imprisonment, the Court 
abandoned the traditional distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, 
in favor of a standard focusing on actual deprivation of liberty.31 
Justice Powell, concurring in the result, agreed with the majority's 
rejection of the felony misdemeanor distinction, but argued that the Court's 
rule was too rigid. 32 He advocated a more flexible due process principle of 
fundamental fairness in determining the applicability of the right to 
counsel. n He asserted that many consequences of even minor 
misdemeanor convictions are not petty, and that col1ateral, non-punitive 
consequences may even be more serious for the defendant than "a brief 
stay in jail."34 Accordingly, Justice Powell concluded that, "When the 
deprivation of property rights and interest is of sufficient consequence, 
denying the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of 
defending themselves is a denial of due process."35 
Although it resolved the issue of whether the right to counsel applied 
only to felonies, Argersinger itself required further clarification as it 
declined to decide whether the right to counsel attaches if there is not actual 
imprisonment but only the possibility of it.36 A divided Supreme Court in 
Scott v. Illinois,31 narrowed the scope of Argersinger. It declared 
Argersinger meant no more than what it held: that no indigent defendant 
may be sentenced to imprisonment without the state granting the right to 
28. ld. at 37. 
29. ld. at 26, 29. 
30. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32-34. 
31. Id. at 37- 38. 
32. !d. at 47. (Powell, J., concurring). 
33. ld. 
34. /d. at 48. On this point, he was correct. See discussion infra Part V.B.4. 
35. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell's view was that, on a case-
by-case basis, judges must decide whether the matter was one of "sufficient consequence." Id. 
He suggested that three factors be weighed in determining whether appointed counsel is required 
for a fair trial: the complexity of the charged offense, the probable sentence if convicted, and 
case-specific factual circumstances. /d. at 64. 
36. ld. at 51. 
37. Scott v. Hlinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
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assistance of appointed counsel.3s The Court clarified Argersinger's 
application by ruling that the 6th Amendment right to counsel applies only 
if the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment, and not merely 
facing possible imprisonment. 39 The defendant in Scott could have 
received a sentence of up to one year in jail, but he was ultimately only 
fined $50.40 Because he was not ordered to be imprisoned, the Court found 
that the defendant was not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel.41 
The opinion stressed the Argersinger finding that incarceration is a 
uniquely severe sanction warranting appointed counsel.42 It discussed the 
frequent references to cases involving deprivation of liberty and to 
prosecutions that "'actually lead to imprisonment even for a brief 
period. "'43 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell reiterated the concerns he 
first expressed in his Argersinger concurrence, including his misgivings 
about conviction consequences beyond imprisonment and his preference 
for a more flexible due process standard.44 Justice Brennan, writing for the 
dissent, decried the plurality's actual imprisonment standard that deprived 
many defendants of the right to appointed counsel.45 Justice Brennan 
emphasized the language of the 6th Amendment itself, which appears to 
apply the right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions."46 He advocated 
the adoption of the broader authorized imprisonment standard.47 
C. TYPE OF PROCEEDING 
In addition to defining the types of crimes and punishments triggering 
the 6th Amendment nght to counsel, the Supreme Court addressed the 
types of proceedings that require an appointed lawyer. Despite the Gideon-
38. Id. at 373-74. 
39. ld. at 373. 
40. Id. at 375. 
41. Id. at 373-74. 
42. !d. at 372-73. 
43 . Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 ("[T]ne central premise of Argersinger- that actual imprisonment 
is a penalty different in kind from fmcs or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound 
and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the const itutional right to 
appointment of counsel."); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (extending the 
Argersinger-Scott actual imprisonment standard to an activated suspended sentence). Because a 
suspended sentence may result in imprisonment (i.e. , an actual deprivation of liberty that may be 
triggered in the future if certain conditions are not met), such a sentence cannot be imposed if the 
indigent defendant was not offered counsel at trial. Id. 
44. Scott, 440 U.S. at 375 {Powell, J., concurring) .. 
45. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. 
47. Jd. 
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era trend toward broadening the 6th Amendment right to counsel, the Court 
later restricted the type of proceedings covered by the right.48 In one 
principal case, a divided Supreme Court held that there is no right to 
counsel during a pre-indictment police lineup.49 According to Justice 
Stewart's plurality opinion, the right attaches only when adversary judicial 
proceedings have been formally initiated against the defendant. 50 He wrote 
that the Court' s seminal right to counsel cases had all addressed cases 
where such proceedings had already commenced, "whether by way of 
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignrnent."51 Justice Stewart believed that attaching the right to counsel 
upon the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings was consistent 
with, and required by, the "criminal prosecutions" language of the Sixth 
Amendment itself.52 
The following year, in United States v. Ash,53 the Supreme Court 
determined that the 6th Amendment right to counsel did not attach during a 
witness' post-indictment photo identification of the defendant.54 The Court 
found that although such a photo identification may occur after adversary 
judicial proceedings had commenced, it is neither a critical stage of the 
prosecution nor confrontational, since the defendant is not even present.55 
The right is limited to critical, trial-like confrontations, and witness photo 
identifications in the defendant's absence fail to meet that threshold . 56 
48. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,686 (1972). 
49. /d. at 690. But see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 23fr37 (1967) (holding the 
opposite for such proceedings post-indictment). The Supreme Court interpreted the holding of 
United States v. Wade by explaining that: 
We ... [in United States v. Wade} held that a post-indictment pretrial lineup at which 
the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal 
prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence 
of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in 
question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by 
witnesses who attended the lineup. 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). 
50. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. 
51. /d. at 689 (seemingly breaking with earlier cases which had emphasi~ed the nature of the 
identification procedure rather than the stage of the proceeding); see Wade, 388 U.S. at 229-32; 
see also Kirby, 406 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing post-arrest identifications as 
a crucial stage of the proceedings for which counsel is necessary for a fair prosecution). 
52. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690; see also Massiah v . United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) 
(demonstrating the consistency of this view, where Justice Stewart found the defendant's right to 
counsel was violated when, after indictment, defendant who was not in custody was informally 
questioned by undercover agent). 
53. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
54. ld at 30~1. 
55. /d. at 325 (citing United States ex rei. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 745 (1972)). 
56. !d. at 321. Justice Brennan again dissented, contending that pretrial lineups and 
photographic displays alike are critical stages of the prosecution demanding the assistance of 
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D. EXPERTS 
While the Argersinger-Scott and Kirby-Ash line of cases is notable for 
restricting the scope of the 6th Amendment right to counsel, in one 
important area, the Court significantly expanded protections given to the 
accused. Ake v. Oklahoma57 utilized the Court's right to counsel analysis to 
find a parallel right to the appointment of experts for indigent defendants. 58 
The Court found there that in a capital case, an indigent defendant holds a 
constitutional right to a state-provided psychiatric evaluation and assistance 
when essential to prepare an effective defense based on his mental 
condition.59 Focusing on the 14th Amendment's due process guarantee of 
fundamental fairness, Justice Marshall's opinion is reminiscent of the 
Court's earlier seminal right to counsel cases.60 The due process analysis in 
Ake provides a basis for extending rights to assistance besides counsel, 
when an indigent defendant has made an adequate showing that such state-
provided assistance is needed for an effective defense.61 
E. MORE PROTECTION GIVEN IN SOME PLACES 
While the United States Supreme Court has not been overly generous 
in granting counsel in cases in which imprisonment is not ultimately 
ordered,62 many states go beyond the federal constitutional requirement. 
Instead of looking to actual imprisonment [or suspended sentences],63 they 
counsel. !d. at 344. Reiterating his differing interpretation of Wade and objections to the Court's 
distinctions, Justice Brennan argued that the dangers of an uncounseled photo identification are 
equal to-or even greater than-the dangers of an uncounseled lineup. !d. at332-33. 
57. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
58. ld. at 86-87. 
59. Id. at 83. 
60. Jd. at 76. 
61. Jd. at 83. The cases are somewhat mixed across the nation as to the showing defendants 
must make in order to receive expert assistance at trial in such cases. Compare State v. Bridges, 
385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989), with Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993). In 
the former, the court reversed the conviction after the trial judge would not give a fingerprint 
expert when fingerprints were important in a murder prosecution. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d at 339. In 
the latter, the appeals court held that an expert should only be appointed "if the evidence is both 
'critical to the conviction and subject to varying expert opinion.'" Collins, 985 F.2d at 227. 
62. See supra notes 37--47 and accompanying text. Few issues surrounding the start of the 
process remain, as both preliminary hearings and the issuance of indicnnents have been held to be 
adversary judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie, 491 U.S. 293, 296 (2008); Moore 
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977). The one remaining area of dispute is whether the issuance 
of an arrest warrant begins the criminal prosecution. The most recent case is Lattimore v. State, 
where the court found that an arrest pursuant to warrant initiates such proceedings. 95 8 So. 2d 
192, 198 (Miss. 2007). 
63. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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either provide counsel to poor people in all criminal cases, or in all cases 
other than the most minor infractions.64 A few states illustrate the point: 
(1) Some states have lawyers for poor people in essentially all 
criminal cases. For instance, California gives appointed counsel in 
every case in which the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or 
felony, no regard is given as to actual imprisonment as a possible or 
likely penalty.65 The rule in New York is similar, with the high court 
there noting that the state statutory guarantee is more expansive than 
that required by the United States Constitution: "[The statute provides] 
protection to all defendants accused of felonies and misdemeanors 
without reference to the potential sentence attached to the crime."66 
(2) Other states have broad grants, emphasizing the nature of the 
punishment [whether imprisonment or not], asking how serious the 
prosecution actually is. North Carolina assigns a lawyer to indigent 
defendants in cases in which there will either be imprisonment, or a 
fine of more than $500.67 The rules in Vermont and Idaho are similar, 
looking to the nature of the possible fine rather than only imprisonment 
as the sole basis for the appointment of counsel. 68 
(3) In the Federal courts, the judges are guided by the inclusive 
language of the Criminal Justice Act, 69 which calls attention to the 
need for counsel It provides, in part: 
(a) Choice of plan.-Each United States district court, with the 
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation 
throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any 
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in 
accordance with this section. Representation under each plan shall 
include counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary 
for adequate representation. Each plan shall provide the following: 
( 1) Representation shall be provided for any financially eligible 
person who--
(A) is charged with a felony or a Class A misdemeanor; . .. 
64. See infra notes 6.5--{)8 and accompanying text. 
65 . See Tracy v. Municipal Court, 587 P. 2d 227, 230 {CaL 1978) ; Mills v. Municipal Court, 
5 15 P. 2d 273,301 (Cal. 1973). 
66. People v. Ross, 493 N.E.2d 91 7, 920 (NY 1986). 
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(I) {2007). 
68. In Vermont, a $1000 potential fine is the dividing line as to whether the defendant has 
been charged with a serious crime mandating the appointment of counsel, VT. STAT. tit . 13 §§ 
523 1, 5201 (4)(B); in Idaho, that line is drawn at $300, State v. Hardman, 818 P. 2d 782, 785 
(Idaho App. 1991). 
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2008). 
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(2) Whenever the United States magistrate judge or the court 
determines that the interests of justice so require, representation may 
be provided for any financially eligible person who-
(A) is charged with a Class B or C misdemeanor, or an infraction for 
which a sentence to confinement is authorized.70 
(4) Some states follow the federal view by relying on the dictates of 
fairness or due process. In Delaware, the trial judge is to look at the 
totality of circumstances.71 "If after weighing these factors a court 
determines that, as a matter of due process and fundamental fairness, 
the defendant should be represented, then counsel should be appointed 
even if a Joss of physical liberty is not threatened."72 
III. THE PRAISE 
The response to the Court's decision in Gideon was overwhelmingly 
positive. Savvy criminal justice observers such as Anthony Lewis73 viewed 
"the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright . . . [as one] in which every man 
charged with a crime will be capably defended"-"Gideon was the start of 
the right to counsel revolution in the United States."74 And, the Court's 
decision truly was revolutionary. Prior to Gideon, many criminal 
defendants--even in quite serious cases-had to represent themselves at 
trial; after Gideon, in most criminal cases, counsel was to be assigned to 
assist them.75 Moreover, this assignment was not to be made on any sort of 
case by case basis in which a judge or magistrate decided if unusual 
conditions were present to justify the outlay of public funds. 76 No, the 
appointment of counsel was to be made routinely in most criminal 
matters. 77 To be sure, it was not just the most serious crimes which would 
form the basis for the right to an attorney. 78 Almost all consequential 
70. !d. (emphasis deleted). 
71. Black v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A. 2d 164, 169 (Del. Super. 1996). 
72. !d. ; see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a detailed look at the federal 
approaches here. 
73 . Author of the highly acclaimed book, GJDEON'S TRUMPET. 
74. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING 
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, i, iv (2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/legalserviceslsclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf. 
75. !d. 
76. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. The so-called special circwnstances rule 
was announced in Betts v. B~ady. 315 U.S. 791 (1942). The Justices there were not willing to 
apply the Sixth Amendment to state cases. !d. Instead, the criminal defendant only had a claim 
under the U.S. Constitution, if he could show that his due process rights were violated because of 
the trying circumstances in his particular case necessitating the assistance of counsel. !d. 
77. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 3 72 U.S. 335, 348 ( 1963 ). 
78. !d. 
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criminal charges would give rise to the automatic appointment of a 
lawyer.79 Even the most minor of cases in which some imprisonment-
truly any imprisonment-was going to be imposed upon conviction would 
mandate the presence of counsel.80 
IV. THE CRITIQUES 
Gideon and later cases were quite properly praised highly for, finally, 
bringing a sense of basic fairness to criminal proceedings. After all, the 
notion of a criminal defendant having insufficient assistance was 
condemned more than 75 years ago in the Scottsboro case.81 Few observers 
in recent times, however, have spoken quite so positively about 
developments in the field. In a host of areas, sadly, the Court's broad and 
ringing language seems no longer to be heard. I will address briefly just a 
few of these, as I will be focusing attention principally in Section V on an 
analysis of the decisions limiting application of the doctrine to trials not 
involving sentences of actual imprisonment upon conviction. 
A. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM 
Study after study, review upon review, report after report, make 
certain-with virtually no dissent-that the hope of providing capable 
lawyers to all poor defendants in criminal cases is not being realized. In 
spite of enormous sums of money being spent throughout the United States 
on tremendous numbers of cases,82 the system of providing counsel across 
much of our nation is, in a word, broken.83 
This writer is co-author of a large national study in which just that 
conclusion was reached. 84 Many states and counties around the country fail 
to provide adequate funds, training, and staffing for public defender 
offices.85 Other areas do not have public defender offices, and instead 
contract with the lowest law fum bidder to provide representation for 
indigent defendants. 86 In all of these situations, the result is too often 
unmanageable caseloads and representation that is so perfunctory or 
79. ld. 
80. Id. 
81. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
82. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees 
for indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 2045, 2046 (2006). 
83. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION supra note 74, for a comprehensive look. 
84. Mazy Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 1031 (2006). 
85. /d. at 1034-37. 
86. /d. at 1117-18. 
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deficient as to amount to no representation at all.87 One commentator 
stated the matter forcefully: 
Gideon is a great story, with a great lesson, and for that reason taught 
in American high schools, colleges, and law schools. What isn't 
taught, however, is our utter failure to realize the promise represented 
by Gideon's case. Lewis's book, Gideon's Trumpet, published in 
1964, one year after the Gideon decision was handed down, bears the 
mark of optimistic faith in progress that so characterized the period. 
But even Lewis predicted that it would be an enormous task to bring to 
life the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright, the dream in which every man 
charged with a crime will be capably defended, no matter what his 
economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him 
will do so proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the 
support needed to make an adequate defense. Much like Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.'s dream of the same year, the dream of Gideon has not 
been realized. The most troubling lesson of the more than thirty-five 
years since Gideon v. Wainwright is that neither the Supreme Court 
nor the public appears to have any interest in making the constitutional 
right announced in Gideon a reality.88 
B. DEFINING INDIGENCY, OR NOT 
Without doubt, Clarence Earl Gideon was poor, he had no money.89 
Many other indigent individuals similarly situated are obviously entitled to 
benefit under the various Supreme Court decisions.90 However, other 
people-even those struggling seriously with financial concerns-may not 
be so fortunate as to be entitled to government support for a legal defense, 
depending upon which state is prosecuting. 
The difficulty here is that the United States Supreme Court through its 
many 6th Amendment decisions has never chosen to define the term 
indigency; it has never explained the reach of its decisions. The states 
hardly have adopted uniform rules. In some states, the defendant will have 
to show that she is truly destitute, without any funds at all.91 Other states 
87. Backus & Marcus, supra note 84, at 1056; see also Erica Hashimoto, The Price of 
Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461,464 (2007); Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Gideon' s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 955,960 (2004). 
88. David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System, 
98 MICH. L. REv. 1941, 1947-48, 1964--65 (1999). 
89. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET(1964). 
90. The numbers are laid out well in Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 481-83. 
91. State v. Hoffman, 190 S.E. 2d 842, 850 (N.C. 1972), where the defendant had a total of 
$160.00: "we take judicial notice that for a fee of less than $160.00, defendant could have 
obtained counsel." !d. at 739. According to inflation charts, $160.00 in 1972 would be worth 
about S822.00 today. Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-binlcpicalc.pl (last visited May 
13, 2008). 
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have statutes which are far more defendant friendly.9z Some state courts 
take a broad view in judicial decisions and conclude that "it is not 
necessary . . . to establish total destitution."93 Other statutes give 
essentially no direction at all, speaking in tenns of the accused 
"demonstrating [his/her] fmancial inability to obtain legal counsel,"94 or 
being "financially unable to secure legal representation. "9~ 
Unfortunately, we are left with similarly situated individuals being 
treated quite dissimilarly throughout the nation. That can hardly be the 
result contemplated by Justice Black and his colleagues almost 50 years 
ago.96 
92. OR. REv. STAT. § 135.050 (2008), which indicates that appointment should occur if "the 
defendant is financially unable to retain adequate representation without substantial hardship in 
providing basic economic necessities to the defendant or the defendant's dependent family." Id. 
93. March v. Municipal Court, 498 P. 2d 437, 441 (Cal. 1972). 
94. HAW. REV. STAT. 802-4 (2008). 
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-450(a) (2008). 
96. United States 11. Parker, 439 F.3d 81, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2006). Parker is one of the very 
few cases in recent years to discuss indigence in any detail: 
Courts have utilized a broad range of considerations in conducting an appropriate 
inquiry into financial eligibility . . . . The task necessarily varies with the 
circumstances presented, and no one method or combination of methods is required. 
In many cases, the court's inquiry may properly be limited to re11iew of fiDancial 
information supplied on the standard form fmancial affidavit. In11estigation of the 
applicant's assets, liabilities, income and obligations alone may constitute sufficient 
inquiry. 
We have examined a variety of factors relevant to the fiDancial eligibility 
detennination. . . . [W]e [have] highlighted the economic realities of the situation 
including the costs of a criminal defense. . [W]c focused on the business 
investments of the defendant. . . . [W]e considered whether the defendant owned or 
controlled substantial assets and whether the defendant had concealed those assets. 
We also indicated that a defendant's own funds must be wetghed against the 
anticipated cost of trial. 
We have also considered the defendant's necessities and the cost of providing for 
himself and dependents. 
Id. at 93 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Parker also recognized that the 
Federal Act "may not be construed in a way that would ignore the realities of a defendant's duties 
with respect to his family." /d. 
In making similar determinations ... , the United States Supreme Court and other 
Courts of Appeals have also considered such factors as the availability of income to 
the defendant from other sources, the possibility of reimbursement of legal fees, the 
liquidity of assets for purposes of paying counsel, the applicant's ability to pay a 
portion of his counsel's fees, . . . the defendant's credibility (or lack thereof) in 
portraying his fmancial eligibility .. , . Overall . .. a district court should not restrict 
itself to a particular method of assessing a criminal defendant's eligibility for 
appointed counsel. 
ld. at 93-94 n.13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
For decades, the Supreme Court struggled with the legal standard to 
be applied to the many ineffective assistance claims which are brought. 
Finally, in Strickland v. Wa.shington,91 the Justices laid out the basic 
principles. The decision began well enough for the indigent defendant, as 
the Justices acknowledged that the right to counsel contemplates the work 
of a capable lawyer.98 The difficulty arose, however, with the definition of 
just what that is to be.99 It is a two part test. 100 The defendant to prevail on 
an ineffective assistance assertion must show that the lawyer at trial was 
not reasonably competent. 101 Here, though, the lower courts are to give 
great deference to that lawyer, for the goal of the Constitution, perhaps 
surprisingly to many, is not to improve the quality of legal representation, 
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The 
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.102 
The hurdle for the defendant is very high here, as the ruling made 
clear that excellence is not the standard, simply reasonable competence. 103 
If, though, this showing can be made, the second part of the Strickland 
standard imposes an even greater hardship on the indigent defendant. To 
prevail, she must also demonstrate that the outcome at the trial would have 
been different had the lawyer been capable.104 This is exceedingly difficult 
to show, for the charge against many appointed counsel is not that they 
affirmatively did something wrong, but rather that they did virtually 
nothing at all. Numerous critics have asserted that lawyers have failed to 
investigate a case thoroughly, have not thoughtfully prepared defense 
witnesses or cross examined government witnesses, have not conducted 
careful research, and have not been seriously engaged in the trial. 105 
97. Suickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
98. See id. at 685-86. 
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at uial alongside the accused, 
however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment 
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing 
a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An 
accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who 
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For that reason, the Court has 
recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of. 
COWlSeJ." 
!d. at 685-86. 
99. !d. at 686. 
100. See id. at 687. 
101. /d. 
102. !d at 689. 
103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
104. /d. at 694. 
105. See, e.g ., Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of 
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Moreover, the lax application of the Sixth 6th Amendment to these cases 
does not impact solely on the defendants, though it surely does that. It has 
dire consequences for the lawyers as well: 
Constitutional decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment have 
established a standard for effective assistance of counsel that has been 
universally criticized as far less demanding than the ethical and 
professional standards governing defense attorneys. The result is that, 
rather than requiring defenders of the indigent to meet professional 
standards, the constitutional test for ineffective assistance sets the 
standard far lower and permits, and some argue encourages, deficient 
lawyering.106 
While recently the Supreme Court, at times, has been willing to more 
actively apply the Strickland standard in some capital cases, few such 
applications can be cited. 107 Not many cases can be seen which rebut the 
hard criticism given two decades ago by Justice Marshall that "all manner 
of negligence, ineptitude, and even callous disregard for the client pass 
muster under the Strickland standard."108 
D. THE STAGE AND TYPE OF PROCEEDINGS 
After a few decades of decisions regarding the 6th Amendment we 
are left, as discussed above, with a rather peculiar situation as to the stage 
and type of proceeding to which the counsel right applies. The defendant 
will be allowed the appointment of counsel only if she has been formally 
charged, and only if she is personally confronted by witnesses against 
her. 109 The situation truly is peculiar, for it results in quite unfair conditions 
for some criminal defendants. 110 
Poor, Minoriry and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalry, 57 Mo. L. REv. 849, 858-
59 (1992); Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
911, 912 (2005); WilliamS. Geimer, A Decade in Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical 
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91, 100 (1995); Bruce A. 
Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective , 52 EMORY L.J. 
1169, 1169-70 (2003). 
106. Backus & Marcus, supra note 84, at !087. 
107. Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 
348-49 (2008); see Robert R. Rigg, The T-Ra Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington 
and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REv. 77, 86-87 (2007). Even 
those authorS would seemingly concede, however, that the broader view of sm·ckland occurs 
almost always, when it happeru, in capital cases. 
108. Bright, supra note 105, at 860 (citing remarks of Justice Marshall to the Second Circuit 
Judicial Conference in 1988). 
109. Backus & Marcus, supra note 84, at 1041-42. 
110. See William Pena Wells & Brian L. Cutler, The Rightto Counsel at Videotaped Lineups: 
An Emerging Dilemma, 22 CONN. L. REV. 373 (1990). 
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1. The Identification 
The Wade and Kirby cases make clear the problem at issue. All are in 
agreement as to the difficulties of eyewitness identification} 11 In many 
cases, identifications have been shown to be untrustworthy, yet juries 
appear to rely heavily upon the statements made by witnesses indicating 
that this person was the one who committed the crime.112 Still, even with 
this reality-and the strong language in Wade as to the role to be played by 
defense counsel here-we can see two defendants who will be treated quite 
differently in terms of the assignment of counsel, because of the 
requirement that there be a formal charge before the presence of counsel is 
needed. 
Defendant #1 was arrested on the street, taken to the police station 
and immediately placed in a lineup over her objection that she was not 
given the right to have a lawyer observe. She was there identified by the 
victim of the crime, and soon thereafter formally charged with the crime. 
Without much doubt, the witness's statement of identification will be 
admissible at the trial, even though a defense lawyer was not present at the 
identification. 
Defendant #2 was also arrested on the street, also taken to the police 
station, and then formally charged with the crime. Immediately thereafter, 
he was placed in a lineup over his objection that he was not given the right 
to have a lawyer observe. He was there identified by the victim of the 
crime. Without much doubt, the witness's statement of identification will 
not be admissible at the trial, precisely because defense counsel for him 
was not present at the identification.113 Indeed, the witness's in-court 
identification might also not be admissible if it is viewed as tainted by the 
earlier identification. 114 
111. The Innocence Project indicates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest 
cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a role in more than 75% of convictions 
overturned through DNA testing. Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php. 
112. Marc Green, Errors in Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/mistakenid.html. "Jurors treat eyewitness identification 
as compelling evidence in both civil and criminal trials." /d. 
113. This was very much the situation in Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). There, the 
defendant was identified at a hearing, but the Court would not allow evidence of that 
identification, on Sixth Amendment grounds. /d. This, in spite of the fact that the identification 
was made in open court, and in front of a judge and the states' attorney. /d. If, however, the 
identification bad been made twenty minutes earlier, en route to the charging procedure, it seems 
clear that the identification would not have raised right to counsel concerns. 
114. See Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F. 3d 117 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 840; State 
v. McMorris, 570 N.W. 2d 384 (Wis. 1997); United States v. Williams, 999 S. Supp. 412 
(W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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This result is peculiar because the defendant is in the same situation in 
both cases, as is the witness and also the identification procedure. The only 
difference is whether that lineup took place just before, or just after, the 
formal charge. This concern, surely, is at the base of the decisions in some 
states to give appointed counsel even before a formal charge is brought. 115 
115. Under§ 13 of the Indiana Constitution, Indiana's right to counsel may attach before the 
filing of formal charges . See Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 928 n.4 (Ind. 1998); see also Taylor 
v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702-{)4 (Ind. 1997). Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution 
applies the right to counsel upon the initiation of formal proceedings, or where an uncharged 
person has actually retained a lawyer, or while in custody, has requested a lawyer. See N.Y. 
CONST. art. 1, § 6; People v. Lyons, 4 A.D.3d 549, 551 (N.Y. A.D. 3 Dept. 2004). Mississippi 
extends the right to counsel to the "accusatory stage" instead of adopting the formal charge and 
critical stage standards required by Kirby. See Porter v. State, 732 So. 2d 899, 904 (Miss. 1999) 
(noting that the 6th Amendment right to counsel and the Mississippi constitution's right to 
counsel "are identical and differ only as to the time when each attaches"). Mississippi's right to 
counsel attaches "once the proceedings against the defendant reach the accusatory stage." Page v. 
State, 495 So. 2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1986). The "accusatory stage" is defined by Mississippi law to 
occur when a warrant is issued or, "by binding over or recognizing the offender to compel his 
appearance to answer the offense, as well as by indictment or affidavit." !d. This right to counsel 
"attaches at the point in time when 'the initial appearance under Rul e 1.04 ... ought to have been 
held .... "' Porter, 732 So. 2d at 904. Oregon posits an even broader interpretation of"criminal 
prosecution" in order to extend the state constitution's right to counsel, OR. CONST. art. I ,§ II, 
prior to the filing of formal charges. See State v. Spencer, 750 P.2d 147, 155-56 (Or. 1988). The 
Oregon Supreme Court he ld that an arrested driver has a limited right to counsel prior to deciding 
whether to acquiesce to a breath test. Id. at 156. In attaching the right to counsel after arrest, but 
before charging, the court found that: 
A person taken into fonnal custody by the police on a potentially criminal charge is 
confronted with the full legal power of the state, regardless of whether a formal 
charge has been filed. Where such custody is complete, neither the lack of a selected 
charge nor the possibility that the police will think better of the e ntire matter changes 
the fact that the arrested person is, at that moment, ensnared in a "crimina! 
prosecution." The evanescent nature of the evidence the police seek to obtain may 
justify substantially limiting the time in which the person may exercise h1s or her 
Article I, section 11, right, but it does not justify doing away with it. 
Id. at 155-56. 
While states commonly extend the right to counsel prior to formal charging by a confirmation of 
constitutional provisions and case law, some states also explicitly extend the right with speci fi e 
statutory rights. This approach is often adopted to extend the right to counsel when the accused is 
requested to submit to a pre-charge chemical test that may produce incriminating evidence. For 
example, in State v. Sadek, the North Dakota Supreme Court wrote that the "r ight [of an arrested 
person] to consult with an attorney before taking a chemical test is not derived from the state or 
federal constitutions, but from section 29-05-20, N.D.C.C." 552 N.W.2d 7 1, 72-73 (N.D. 1996). 
The Vermont Supreme Court in State v. Welch, interpreted 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a), a statute 
governing implied consent for blood alcohol testing, to recognize a limited right to counsel. 376 
A.2d 35 1, 355 ( 1977). As submission to such a chemical test m ay constitute a critical stage of the 
criminal proceedings against the accused, this implied consent law places "the suspect operator in 
a situation where counsel could be of aid." !d. The decision was then codified in 23 V.S.A. § 
1202(c) (2008), stating in part: "A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to 
submit to an evidentiary test or tests has a right as herein limited to consult an attorney before 
deciding whether or not to submit to such a test or tests .... " The Washington State Supreme 
Court recognized a right to counsel based not on the 6th Amendment, the state constitution, state 
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2. The Confrontation 
It is only if the defendant is personally confronted by others that the 
right to counsel issue arises, even if the identification proceeding occurs 
after an indictment. 116 So, full and partial lineups may require counsel, but 
photo displays and sampling of voice, blood, hair, and fmgerprints do 
not.117 Here, too, one can label the result as peculiar, for the empirical 
evidence strongly advises against non-live photo identifications; these 
identifications raise grave concerns about misidentifications. 118 The 
response of the Justices, in the Ash case, was dismissive. 119 "We are not 
persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so 
pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required." 120 
statutes, or even other case law, but instead on a state judicial rule, pursuant to the court's 
procedural authority. See generally State v. Templeton, 59 P.3d 632 (Wa. 2002) (discussing state 
judicial rule and procedJ.Iral authority). The Washington court focused on its procedural rule-
making authority over matters of evidence, and ellplained that in the absence of its intervention, 
the 6th Amendment right to counsel would generally only attach upon the initiation of adver sary 
judicial proceedings. !d. 
116. See U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,316 (1973). 
ll7. ld. at 3 15-1 6. 
118. These concerns are reflected in the many studies calling for sweeping changes to the 
processes used for such identification. See, e.g., JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, CALIFORNIA 
COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENIIFICATION PROCEDURES passim (2006), 
http:l/www.ccfaj.orgldocuments/reports/eyewitnesslofficiaVeyewitnessidrep.pdf; see also Karin 
Bruilliard, Revamping Virginia's Police Lineups, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at COl, available at 
http://www.psychology.iastatc.edul-glwclls/washingtonpostVirginiastory.pdf; STATE OF 
WISCONSIN OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR 
EYEWlTNESS IDENTIFICATION (2005), 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond 
a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1487 (2008), for fme discussion of the broad legal problems here. See also 
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005). These sources explore the empirical evidence: 
Heather D. Flow & Ebbe B. Ebbeson, The Effect of Lineup Member Similarity on Recognition 
Accuracy in Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 3 I LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 33 (2007); Beth 
Schuster, Police Lineups: Making Eyewitness Identification More Reliable, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. 
258 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/joumals/258/police-
lineups.hJml#backiO; Gary L. Wells et a!., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 
7 PSCYCHOL. SCI. TN THE PUB. INT. 2, 45 (2006), available at 
http://www .psychology .iastate.edulfaculty/gwells/W ells_articles_pdf/pspi_7 _2_article[ I ).pdf; 
James M. Doyle, No Confidence: A Step Toward Accuracy in Eyewitness Trials, THE CHAMPION 
(Jan./Feb. 1998), 
http://www .crirninaljustice.orgiCHAMPION/ ARTICLES/98jan0 l.htm. 
119. Ash, 413 U.S. at 32 1. 
120. !d. 
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E. THE TYPE OF CASE 
The Supreme Court in Gideon had before it the ideal case in which to 
state the 6th Amendment doctrine. 121 After all, the defendant there 
specifically requested a lawyer at the trial in a serious criminal case. 122 At 
Gideon's trial, he was sentenced to a term of five years in the state 
penitentiary. 123 What would happen if this had not been such a serious 
case, if he had not been sentenced to any term of imprisonment? One 
might be excused if, after viewing the glorious Gideon's Trumpet, 124 he or 
she thought that the defendant would have been entitled to a lawyer even 
though no imprisonment had been ordered. 125 To be sure, it is a common 
misconception that all criminal defendants in the United States are entitled 
to assisted counsel if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer.126 
121. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-38 (1963). 
122. !d. at 336-37. 
123. !d. at 337. 
124. GIDEON'S TRUMPET {Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions 1980) is a 1980 film starring 
Henry Fonda, with a short cameo appearance at the very end of the movie by Anthony Lewis, 
author of the book GIDEON'S TRUMPET {1964 ). 
125. GIDEON'S TRUMPET, supra note 124. 
126. See generally WALTER DEAN MYERS, SHOOTER 164 (2004) (including a fictitious 
"Statement of Waiver of Privilege and Miranda Warning," which reads, in part, "I further 
understand that I have a right to an attorney. If I cannot, on my own, avail myself of legal help, [ 
will be furnished with an attorney by the State."); Everyone Is Entitled to an Attorney, 
http:/!homesweethome.wordpress.com/200812/11/everyone-is-entitled-to-an-attomey/ (Feb. 11, 
2008 06:00 EST) (commenting on an article describing the investigation of accused murderer 
Andrew Boisvert); Gideon's Trumpet Stilled, N.Y. TlMES.COM, Mar. 21, 2003, 
http://query.nytimes. com/gstlfullpage.html?res""9A02E4DE1 E31 F932A 15 750COA965 9C 8B63&s 
cp=2sq=poor+right+to+lawyer&st=nyt (suggesting that all poor criminal d efendants have a 
constitutional right to a lawyer, regardless of whether confinement is possible, and going an to 
note that "[t]hat principle is now ingrained in our culture"); Preserving the Right to a Lawyer, 
N.Y.TIMES.COM, Apr. 25,2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/25/opinionf25mon2.html?scp=l&sq=poor+right+to+lawyer&st 
"''lyt {stating that "Criminal defendants who cannot afford a lawyer have the right to have one 
appointed to represent them" and "[t]he Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case of Gideon v. 
Wainwright that poor defendants have a constitutional right to appointed counsel"); Promise of 
Right to Counsel for Poor Remains an ll/usion in Michigan (Especially in Berrien}, BANCO 
(BLACK AUTONOMY NETWORK COMMUNITY 0RGANIZA TION), Mar. 18, 2008, 
http:/lbhbanco.blogspot.com/2008/04/promise-of-right·to-counsel-for-poor.html (''[t]he landmark 
1963 [Gideon] decision held that the Constitution guarantees every person ... the right to an 
attorney even if he or she cannot afford one); Joyce Pumick, Metro Matters; A110ther Frill: 
Giving the Poor Good Lawyers, N.Y. T!MES.COM, Mar. 11, 1996, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B03EEDC1039F932A25750COA960958260&s 
ec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 (addressing the inability of indigent individuals to obtain adequate 
legal representation: "[p]oor defendants, by law, have a right to a lawyer, but the courts are 
swamped"); The Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Jan. 24,2003, 
http://query .nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02 EOD71 F30F93 7 A I 5752COA9659C8B63 
(quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963), but failing to mention that the doctrine 
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That, of course, is not the law. As noted above, the Justices in Scott 
and Shelton decided that an attorney is not required in all criminal cases. It 
is just that the sentencing judge cannot order any term of imprisonment 
[either on an immediate or suspended basis] unless counsel had been 
offered to the defendant. 127 Many have disagreed with the Court's holding 
on basic fairness grounds. One commentator stated the matter cogently: 
Therefore, if we accept the Gideon premise that a defendant may suffer 
damage from the lack of counsel, the necessary conclusion is that 
every criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel if she 
so wishes. There is no reason to allow a defendant to be convicted 
after an unfair trial when the potentially unfair result is known from 
only applies to defendants facing potential incarceration); Jill Smolowe, The Trials of the Public 
Defender, TIME.COM, Mar. 29, 1993, 
http://www.time.com/timefmagazine/article/0,9171,9781 05-l,OO.html ("The Sixth Amendment 
established, and the landmark Gideon Supreme Court case affirmed, the right of poor people to 
legal counsel," without regard to severity of potential criminal penalty or incarceration); The Law 
Firm of Solomon M. Musyimi, A Professional Corporation Homepage, 
http://www.solomonthelawyer.com!houston_lawfurn!houston_criminal_law.htm (stating that 
"[e]very person accused of a crime has the right to an attorney [and ilf you cannot afford an 
attorney, the state must provide one) (last visited June 12, 2008); Posting of J, Raichasa, 
Justaquestioner, Mild Irritant, & Rich K to Yahoo! Answers, 
http://answers.yahoo.com/questionlindex?qid=2008021218453 6AAkqJA3 (Feb. 12, 2008 
18:45:46 EST) (concluding that J is entitled to a court appointed lawyer for two unspecified 
misdemeanor charges); Posting of William A. Saunders to A IIExperts Crime & Law Enforcement 
Issues & Death Penalty, 
http://en.allexperts.com/q/Crime·Law-Enforcement·341!2008/4/Misdemeanor·Shoplifting·2.htm 
(answering a question about shoplifting consequences, poster advises that, based on the 
information he had been provided, she will be assigned a public defender if she cannot afford an 
attorney) (Apr. 14, 2008). 
Indeed, in my Criminal Procedure class each year, I ask a group of second and third year 
law students -bright, thoughtful, well educated people- the following questions: 
An important area for discussion is the right to counsel in criminal cases in the United 
States. Before coming to law school, which of these positions did you think was 
correct: (1) A person who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to appointed 
counsel if, upon conviction, she could receive a sentence in excess of6 months in jail; 
(2) A person who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to appointed counsel 
if, upon conviction, she could receive a sentence of actual imprisonment; (3) A person 
who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to appointed counsel in all 
criminal cases; ( 4) person who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is never entitled 
to appointed counsel in criminal cases. 
In February 2008, the result in votes was: 0 votes for (1); 14 votes for (2); 52 votes for (3); I vote 
for (4). This was a fairly typical tally for the annual exercise. Most people I encounter think poor 
people will get appointed counsel in all criminal cases. Indeed, one student in the class wrote a 
personal note: "This is embarrassing, but in the spirit of helping your survey, I feel that 1 must 
tell you that my original understanding of the "right of counsel" wasn't listed on your survey. I 
didn't think that "being poor" was a part of it-I just thought you had a right to an attorney, no 
matter who you are. And sadly, I didn't make the connection until this semester that income is an 
essential component." 
127. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 
(2002). 
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the outset of trial, however minor the offense committed. As long as 
petty offenses are considered criminal and are not adjudicated through 
non-judicial avenues, such as administrative bodies, a person is entitled 
to a fair trial before being labeled an offender.128 
And, certainly, there are a number of states which do indeed require 
counsel in all criminal cases, by statute or by state constitutional 
provision. 129 Still, many defendants are forced to proceed without a lawyer 
in criminal cases, as we shall see. In the next section, I will set out the 
concerns as to this state of affairs and argue why -for several reasons-the 
common perception should become the reality. 
V. WHY LIMIT THE RIGHT TO CASES WITH AN 
IMPRJSONMENT CONNECTION? 
It is fair to say that the issues being raised in this article have not been 
among the most hotly debated within the criminal justice system in recent 
times. Some states, and there are quite a number of them -as indicated 
below-rejected the imprisonment connection entirely. They passed 
statutes, or interpreted their own constitutions, so as to require counsel in 
all or virtually all criminal cases. However, other states, many facing 
intense budget concerns, simply did not move on the matter. There has 
been little discussion as to the several broad policy issues raised by the 
Supreme Court's restriction. Only two issues have garnered much 
attention. 
A. THE CONCERNS 
1. The Intent, Language in the 6th Amendment 
The 6th Amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."130 
Obviously, there is nothing in this language about the appointment of 
lawyers for those who cannot afford to retain counsel. On this point, the 
legislative history seems pretty clear, the founders were not contemplating 
such appointments. Instead, the Amendment was offered to ensure that a 
hearing would "include[] the right to the aid of counsel when desired and 
provided by the party asserting the right."m "Regardless of whether 
128. Rinat Kitai, What Remains Necessary Following Alabama v. Shelton to Fulfill the Right 
of a Criminal Defendant to Counsel at the Expense ofthe State?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 46 
(2004). 
129. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. 
130. U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. 
131. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,68 (1932). 
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petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right 
to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified."132 
Still, this was also the argument made by Florida in Gideon and, of 
course, that view did not prevail, because the assistance of a lawyer was 
said to be fundamental and essential to a fair trial.133 Moreover, one might 
have thought that once the Court ruled that criminal defendants such as 
Clarence Gideon were entitled to appointed counsel and not simply because 
of special circumstances, 134 the language in the Constitution, In all criminal 
prosecutions, would actually be taken to mean that appointment was 
required in all cases rather than simply in some cases. 
2. The Costs Would Be Too High 
Clearly of great pause for the Justices in possibly extending counsel 
rights in all criminal cases was the financial impact it would have on the 
states. The former Chief Justice stated the matter succinctly in Scott: 
"Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension 
would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily 
substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States."135 Justice Powell, concurring 
in Argersinger, was considerably more thoughtful as to the types of costs 
that a blanket rule would create: 
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be a prophylactic 
rule that would require the appointment of counsel to indigents in all 
criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it 
could be applied automatically in every case, but the price of pursuing 
this easy course could be high indeed in terms of its adverse impact on 
the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is 
apparent when one reflects on the wide variety of petty or 
misdemeanor offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the 
diversity of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state court 
systems is also apparent in view of the variations in types of courts and 
their jurisdictions, ranging from justices of the peace and part-time 
judges in the small communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan centers. 136 
While no one would suggest that these costs are insubstantial, 137 the 
fact is that when Scott was decided, most states actually did then provide 
132. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954). 
133. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342 (1963). 
134. After all, Gideon overruled the special circumstances requirement earlier set out in Betts 
v. Brady. ld. a t 350 (Douglas, J., concurring). It did so with ringing language, noting "th at Bells 
was an anachronism when handed down." ld. at 345. 
135. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). 
136. /d . at 50--51 (Powell, J., concurring). 
137. These costs are well laid out in Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 485-86. 
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lawyers in almost all criminal cases. 138 And, they still do. Thus, it is hard 
to believe that the costs would be so overbearing so as to weigh too heavily 
on the constitutional analysis. In 1979, when the Scott decision was 
handed down, as stated by dissenting Justice Brennan: 
[A] substantial number of States ... already provide counsel in all 
cases where imprisonment is authorized- States that include a large 
majority of the country's population and a great diversity of urban and 
rural environments. Moreover, of those States that do not yet provide 
counsel in all cases where any imprisonment is authorized, many 
provide counsel when periods of imprisonment longer than 30 days, 3 
months, or 6 months are authorized. In fact, Scott would be entitled to 
appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 3 3 States. 139 
Jn 2009, the numbers are even more stark as to states which give 
counsel in criminal cases. Forty-six states provide counsel in all, or 
virtually all, criminal cases. 140 The statutory language varies from state to 
138. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 385-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
139. !d. at 385- 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, as noted by Justice Brennan, one of 
the reasons that the costs have not proved insurmountable has been the development of public 
defender offices throughout the country: 
Furthermore, public defender systems have proved economically feasible, and the 
establishment of such systems to replace appointment of private attorneys can keep 
costs at acceptable levels even when the number of cases requiring appointment of 
counsel increases dramatically. The public defender system alternative also answers 
the argument that an "authorized imprisonment" standard would clog the courts with 
inexperienced appointed counsel. 
/d. at 385. 
140. States that provide counsel in criminal cases are as follows: Alaska: ALASKA CONST. art. 
I, § 11, ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (2008), Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910 
(Alaska 1971); Arizona: ARIZ. R. CRJM. P. 6.l(b); Arkansas: ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(b); California: 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (2008); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-103(1,2), 16-5-501 
(2008); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT.§§ 51-296(a), -297(t) (2008); Delaware: DEL. CODE tit. 
29, § 4602 (2003); Florida: FLA. R. CRJM. P. 3.1ll(b); Georgia: GA. UN!F. SUP. Cr. R. 29.2; 
Hawaii: HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14; Idaho; IDAHO CODE§§ 19-851, 852 (2008); Illinois: 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/113-3(b) (2008); Indiana: IND. CONST. art. I, § 13, Bolkovac v. State, 98 N.E.2d 
150 (Ind. 1951); Iowa: IOWA R. CRJM. P. 2.28, 2.61; Kentucky: KY. R. CRIM. P. 3.05; Louisiana: 
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 513 (2003); Maine: ME. R. CRJM. P. 44; Maryland: Mo. CODE CRJM. 
PROC. § 16-204 (2008); Massachusetts: MASS. SUP. Juo. Cr. R. 3:10, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 8; 
Minnesota: MINN. STAT.§§ 609.02, 611.14 (2008); Mississippi: MISS. CODE §§ 25-32-9, 99-15-
15 (2008); Missouri: MO. SUP. CT. R. 31.02; Montana: MONT. CODE § 46-8-10 I (2008); 
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. 29-3902, -3906 (2008); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.397, 
193.120 (2008); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT.§§ 604-A:2, 625:9 (2008) ; New Jersey: N.J. 
STAT. § 2A:158A-5.2 (2008); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. § 31-15-12 (2008); New York: N.Y. 
CR!M. P. LAW§§ 170.10(3), 180.10(3) (2008), N.Y. COUNTY LAW§§ 717, 722-a (2008), People 
v . Weinstock, 363 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1974); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a) (2008); 
North Dakota: N.D. R. CRJM. P. 44; Ohio: OH!O R. CRIM. P. 2, 44; Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 
22, § 1355.6 (2008); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT.§§ 135.045, 135.050(6) (2008); Pennsylvania: PA. 
R. CR!M. P. l22(A); Rhode Island: R.I. SUP. Cr. R. CRJM. P. 44, R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44; 
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6 (2008); Tennessee: TENN. CODE§§ 40-14-102, 
103 (2008); Texas: TEX. CODE CRJM. PROC. art. 26.04 (2007); Utah: UTAH CODE CRIM. P. § 77-
2009) THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 165 
state, however, there are essentially five ways in which to group states and 
their right to counsel statutes-<>nly one grouping consists of states which 
do not grant counsel in all, or virtually, all criminal cases.141 Nine states 
provide counsel in all criminal cases.142 Fifteen states offer counsel for any 
offense punishable by imprisonment. 143 Eight states give counsel for any 
offense punishable by incarceration or a fine of more than a specified 
amount, or for any offense with a minimum incarceration period or fine. 144 
Fourteen states provide counsel for any criminal offense except when 
imprisonment is not authorized as a sentence. 145 Five states require a 
sentence of actual imprisonment for a defendant to be entitled to court-
appointed counsel. 146 
32-302 (2008); Vermont: VT. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (2008); Virginia: VA. CODE§§ 19.2-
159, 160 (2008); Washington: WASH. SUPER. CT. R. § 3.1; West Virginia: W.VA. CODE§ 62-3-1 
(2008); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 967.06 (2008); and Wyoming: WYO. STAT. §§ 7-6-102, 104 
(2008). 
141. See ALA. CRIM. P. §§ 15-12-1, -20 (2008); KAN. STAT. §§ 12-4405, 22-4503; MICH. 
COMP. LAWS§ 775.16 (2008); S.C. CODE§ 17-3-10 (2008); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 6.1 ; State v. 
Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1995); People v. Studaker, 199 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. 1972). 
142. See IND. CONST. art. I,§ 13; CAL. PENAL CODE§ 987 (2008); DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 4602 
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.045, 135.050(6) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6 
(2007); TENN. CODE §§ 40-14-102, -103 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-1 (2005); GA UNIF. 
SUPER. CT. R. 29.2; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44; R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRJM. P. 44; Bolkovac v. 
State, 98 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1951); 
143. See HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 14; IDAHO CODE§§ 19-851, -852 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. 
29-3902, -3906 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.§§ 604-A:2, 625:9 (2008); N.M. STAT.§ 31-15-12 
(2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-45l(a) (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1355.6 (2008); WIS. STAT.§ 
967.06 (2007); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 6. l(b); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.28, 2.61; KY. R. CRJM. P. 3.05; LA. 
CODE CRJM. PROC. art. 513 (2003); MASS. R. CRJM. P. 8; MASS. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 3:10; N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW§§ 170.10(3), 180.10(3) (2008); N.Y. COUNTY LAW§§ 717, 722-a (2008); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04 (2007); WASH. SUPER. CT. R. § 3.1; People v. Weinstock, 363 
N.Y.S.2d 878 (1974). 
144. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § II; ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (2007); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/ 113-3(b) (1993); MD. CODE art. 27A §§ 2, 4 (2007); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.02, 611.14 
(2007); MISS. CODE§§ 25-32·9, 99-15-15 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 178.397, 193.120 (2007); 
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 2, 44; MD. CODE CRIM. P. § 16-204 (2008); Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 
490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971). 
145. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1-103(1,2), 16-5-501 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-
296(a), -297(1) (2008); MONT. CODE§ 46-8-101 (2007); N.J. STAT.§ 2A:I58A-5.2 (2008); UTAH 
CODE § 77-32-302 (2007) (discussing where there is a substantial probability of confinement); 
VA. CODE§§ 19.2-159, -160 (2004); VT. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (2007); WYO. STAT.§§ 7-
6-102, -104 (2007); ARK. R. CRJM. P. 8.2(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1ll(b); ME. R. CR!M. P. 44; 
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 44 (applying to all non-felony cases); PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(A); MO. SUP. CT. R. 
31.02. 
146. See KAN. STAT.§§ 12-4405, 22-4503; ALA. CODE§§ 15-12-1, -20 (2008); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS§ 775.16 (2006); S.C. CODE§ 17-3-10 (2007); ALA. R. CRJM. P. 6.1; State v. Delacruz, 899 
P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1995); People v. Studaker, 199 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. 1972) (discussing any felony 
but only with actual imprisonment for misdemeanors). 
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B. FOUR GOOD REASONS TO ELIMINATE THE RESTRICTIVE R ULE 
If the concerns about extending the right to counsel to all, or virtually 
all, criminal cases in all states are not overpowering, are there at least some 
strong reasons to extend that right? Yes, there are, and here are four of the 
most persuasive. 
1. The Problem is Not Simply Possible, It Happens Regularly 
While many states go beyond the federal mandate and give counsel 
essentially in all criminal cases, that is certainly not the universal rule. 
Quite a number of states do not give counsel in cases in which 
imprisonment is not likely to be a serious option for the sentencing judge. 147 
Furthermore, in several of them, a conviction at that trial can be used 
adversely against the defendant later.148 Consider these illustrative states. 149 
a. Arizona 
Arizona state law does not require the appointment of counsel in all 
cases, and according to one judge there are individuals who are denied 
counsel because the offense does not carry jail time or is not an offense 
involving moral turpitude.150 As put by one permanent law clerk, if the 
prosecutor expressly states he or she is not seeking jail time and the 
defendant will not be held in custody, it is unlikely counsel will be 
appointed, even if requested. 151 The web page for the Tucson City Court 
states: 
You have the right to hire an attorney at your own expense and have 
that attorney represent you at trial. You should know that the court 
will appoint an attorney to you only if the prosecutor is seeking jail 
time as part of your sentence, and the judge finds that you cannot 
afford an attorney. 1 52 
b. Illinois 
Under state law, appointment of counsel is broad. Still, one code 
147. See, e.g. , MICH. COMP. LAWS § 775.1 6 (2006); see also People v. Studaker, 199 N.W. 2d 
177, 179 (Mich. 1972) (stating that any felony but only with actua l imprisonment for 
misdemeanors). 
148. See infra section V.B.2. 
149. These examples come from reported cases, statutes and a lso correspondence (which is on 
file with the author) with j udges, prosecutors and de fense lawyers in the respective states. 
150. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 6.l(b). 
15 1. This example comes from correspondence, which is on file with the author. 
152. Tucson City Court, Your Rights, 
http ://www. tucsonaz.gov/courts!How _ T o!M:otions_ · 
_ Pro_Se!Y our_ Day _In_ CourtlY our_Rights/your _rights.html (last visited May 13, 2008 ). 
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section notes that counsel is not always given.153 "In all cases, except 
where the penalty is a fine only, if the court determines that the defendant 
is indigent and desires counsel, the Public Defender shall be appointed as 
counsel."154 As explained by one law professor there, in some parts of the 
state no lawyer is appointed where jail is not a possible sentence.155 
c. Florida 
The key here is whether the prosecutor is seeking imprisonment upon 
conviction. One judge said, "[e)ven if the defendant wishes to have an 
attorney we do not appoint attorneys based on the announcement on the 
record by the state that they are not seeking jail time [in misdemeanor 
cases)."156 A law professor who has worked closely with public defender 
offices wrote: 
[I]f the judge announce[s] that he/she will not impose a sentence of 
confinement in the case ... [t]he judge ... will inform the defendant 
that he/she is no longer entitled to the services of the public defendant. 
. . . [O]nce the judge has made the decision to not impose confinement 
as a sentence the defender is not allowed to assist the defendant. 157 
d. Virginia 
Virginia state law is quite explicit as to the ability of the trial court to 
require an indigent defendant to proceed on her own without the aid of a 
lawyer. 
However, if, prior to the commencement of the trial, the court states in 
writing, either upon the request of the attorney for the Commonwealth 
or, in the absence of the attorney for the Commonwealth, upon the 
court's own motion, that a sentence of incarceration will not be 
imposed if the defendant is convicted, the court may try the case 
without appointing counsel, and in such event no sentence of 
incarceration shall be imposed. 158 
As stated by one experienced judge, the provision is not used 
frequently, but is used, both on motion of the prosecutor and on the judge's 
own motion. 159 
153. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3b (1993). 
154. ld.; see People v. Campbell, 862 N.E. 2d 933,937 (Ill. 2007). 
155. utter on file with author. 
I 56. Letter on file with author. 
157. Letter on file with author. 
158. VA. CODE 19.2-160 (2004). Several states have similar statutory provisions. See, e.g., 
ARK. CODE, RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 8.2(b); COLO. REV'D STAT. tit. 16, § 16-5-501; WYO. 
STAT. tit. 7, § 7-6-102(a)(v). 
I 59. Letter on file with author. 
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2. Use of Convictions in Later Criminal Cases 
Nichols v. United States, 160 was one of the many counsel cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in the years fo11owing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, as noted previously. What was special in Nichols was that the 
Justices were confronted with an issue that had divided them in the past, 
whether a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction-valid under Scott v. 
Illinois~ould be used to enhance a sentence in a later, unrelated 
prosecution. 161 
Nichols was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 162 In addition to a prior felony drug conviction, a prior 
misdemeanor DUI conviction was used to lift his sentence from 168-210 
months to 188-235 months. 163 His prior misdemeanor conviction was 
uncounseled, and the lower court determined that he had not then waived 
his right to counsel.164 On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the use of his 
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction violated his 6th Amendment 
rights.165 However, the Supreme Court disagreed.166 In rendering its 
decision, the Justices relied heavily on Scott. 167 They held that prior 
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions were valid because they did not 
result in prison time at the time and could be used to enhance a later 
sentence. 168 
160. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
161. See id. at 740; see also Balsadar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (when the issue 
previously carne before the court, the result was a per curiam opinion voiding later enhancements 
based on earlier uncounseled convictions). 
162. See Nichols, 5 11 U.S. at 7 40. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. at 741. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. at 74~9. 
167. See id. at 748. 
168. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748-49. 
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Most states have accepted the Court's decision in Nichols, 169 even in 
response to state constitutional challenges. Not all states do so, however. 170 
Typically, in these cases, the defendants point to serious punishment from 
later convictions resulting from earlier uncounseled convictions. 171 
Defendants also assert that the prior uncounseled convictions should not be 
considered because of their unreliability.172 Still, most state courts agree 
with the rationale expressed in Nichols that enhancement statutes are 
commonplace; that the sentencing process is less rigid than the process of 
establishing guilt; and that judges are allowed to conduct broad inquiries 
and consider a number of factors-including prior criminal history-in 
reaching their decisions. 173 Nevertheless, the later convictions can and 
169. See State v. Thrasher, 783 So. 2d 103, 106 (Ala. 2000); State v. Brooks, 874 A.2d 280, 
286-88 (Conn. 2005); State v. Pressley, 2002 WL 863599, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 
2002); State v. Keeth, 203 S.W. 3d 718, 727-28 (Mo. 2006); Glaze v. State, 621 S.E. 2d 655, 
656-57 (S.C. 2005); State v. Ferguson, Ill P.3d 820, 824-25 (Utah 2005); see also Morris v. 
State, 798 A.2d 1042, 1042-43 (DeL 2002); Simmons v. State, 629 S.E.2d 86, 87-88 (Ga. 2006); 
Williams v. State, 974 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho 1998); People v. Laskowski, 678 N.E. 2d 1241, 1244-
45 (Ill. 1997); Morphew v. State, 672 N.E.2d 461, 465-66 (Ind. 1996); State v. Wilkins, 687 
N.W. 2d 263, 264-65 (Iowa 2004); State v. Cook, 706 A.2d 603, 606-07 (Me. 1998); People v. 
Reichenbach, 459 Mich. 109, 123-24 (Mich. 1998); Ghoston v. State, 645 So. 2d 936, 938-39 
(Miss. 1994); State v. Hansen, 273 Mont. 321, 324-26 (Mont. 1995), abrogated by Alabama v. 
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660 (Mont. 2002); State v. Orduna, No. A-95-284 1995 Neb. App. LEXlS 
396, at *7-9 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1995); State v. Sharp, 694 N.E. 2d 1003, 1003...{)4 (Ohio 
1994); State v. Skala, 2002-0hio-2962; In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813, 
814 (R.I. 1995); State v. Sanders, No. M2005-00088-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. 
LEXIS 506, at *3-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2006); Garcia v. State, 909 S.W. 2d 563, 567 
(Tex. 1995); Kapoor v. Conunonwealth, No. 2582-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 557 at •2-3 (Va. 
App. Nov. 16, 2004);State v. Porter, 671 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Vt. 1996); State v. Schoenick, No. 94-
2536-CR, 1995 Wis. App. LEXIS 296, at *12-13 (Wis. App. Mar. 7, 1995). 
1 70. See, e.g., these cases, relying on their own state constitutional counsel provisions: State 
v. Hrycak, 877 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 2005) (emphasizing the unreliability ofuncounseled convictions) ; 
State v. Deville, 879 So. 2d 689 (La. 2004) (under Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana 
Constitution, an indigent individual has the right to appointed counsel if he is charged with an 
offense punishable by imprisorunent. Because the Louisiana Constitution affords a greater right 
to counsel than the Federal Constitution, an individual's prior uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction punishable by imprisonment cannot be used to enhance his sentence or reclassify his 
offense.); Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1998) (Prior uncounseled convictions could not 
be used to "impose or enhance a subsequent prison sentence." The rationale is that prior 
uncounseled convictions are unreliable.). 
171. See supra note 170. 
172. !d. 
173. See, e.g., State v . Woodruff, 951 P.2d 605, 606 (N.M. 1997) (stating that with the 
enhancement, the maximum amount of jail time the defendant could have received increased 
from 90 days to 364 days and he faced a mandatory jail term of not less than 72 hours); State v. 
Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Kan. 1995) (stating that as a result of the enhancement, the 
defendant was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment with a "post-release supervision period of 
24 months." Without the enhancement, the defendant might not have received any imprisonrnent 
at all.); State v. Hopkins, 453 S.E. 2d 317, 319 ryi.Va. 1994) (stating that because of the 
enhancement, the defendant was sentenced to 1-10 years in prison and he was "fined $500 for the 
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often do result in far greater punishment-potentially years in pri·son-
based entirely on the enhancement due to the earlier uncounseled 
convictions. 174 
3. Minor cases can be complicated 
Argersinger made clear that a judge could not sentence the defendant 
to any term of imprisonment unless the defendant had been give the option 
of legal representation. 175 The rationale of the Supreme Court in Scott for 
drawing the Sixth Amendment line at actual imprisonment is that actual 
imprisorunent is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of 
imprisorunent.176 Presumably, one reason the majority Justices were able to 
reach that conclusion is the notion that the minor criminal cases, those not 
involving imprisonment, just are not very difficult, and the absence of 
counsel would not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding. 177 Yet, in 
the Court's Argersinger opinion, Justice Douglas argued forcefully that it is 
the nature of the issues, not the type of punishment involved, which should 
determine how important the presence of counsel would be. 178 "[E)ven in 
prosecutions for offenses less serious than fejonies, a fair trial may require 
the presence of a lawyer."179 
And, Justice Douglas was correct. Law students routinely study 
complex and difficult criminal cases in which no imprisonment is ordered 
upon conviction. The reader's attention is directed to several ofthese: 180 
• Powell v. Texas.181 A split Supreme Court decides that a 
defendant may be convicted when being found in a state of 
conviction, $50 as a mandatory penalty, payable to the mercantile establishment, and the costs of 
the proceeding;" this was considerably more than would have been possible without the 
enhancement). 
174. &e, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1575-76 (2008) (stating that the 
defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor offense in state court and later convicted of an 
unrelated federal drug offense). Because the state CQnviction was subject to more than one year's 
imprisonment-though classified by the state as a misdemeanor-it co uld be viewed as a "felony 
drug offense" for the purpose of imposing a substantial minimum sentence of federal 
imprisonment !d. at 1576. 
175. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
176. See Scott v. lllinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). This view was immediately, and 
strongly, criticized in Right to Counsel Where Imprisonment is Possible, 93 HARV. L. REV. 82, 
86-87 (1979). 
177. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 367. 
178. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 39. 
179. See id. at 34. 
180. With thanks to these law professors for making excellent suggestions of such cases: John 
Douglass, Roger Fairfax, Stuart Green, Susan He!lDan, Sheri Johnson, Wayne Logan, Leo 
Romero, and David Wexler. 
181. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
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intoxication in a public place. 182 Defendant was fined $20. 183 
• Atwater v. City of Lago Vista. 184 The famous soccer mom can 
be arrested for a very minor offense [driving without a 
seatbelt]. 185 She was fined $50. 186 
• Scott v. lllinois. 181 A minor shoplifting case, in which the 
defendant was fined $50, the very case which decided the 
Sixth Amendment limitation. 188 
• Jacobson v. United States. 189 Upon conviction for receiving 
obscene materials through the mails, the defendant was 
ordered to serve two years probation and 250 hours of 
community service. 190 Major entrapment decision by the 
Court. 
• Staples v. United States. 191 Penalty here was probation and 
fine. 192 An important case laying out the state of mind 
requirement for a firearms vio1ation. 193 
• Lawrence v. Texas. 194 After a nolo contendre plea, the trial 
court ordered a $200 fine. 195 In a landmark decision, the 
Justices struck down an anti-sodomy statute.196 
• Gall v. United States. 191 The question here was whether a 
sentence imposed outside the range suggested by the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines need be justified by extraordinary 
circumstances. 198 The defendant was given 36 months 
probation for selling ecstacy. 199 
• Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada.200 
182. See id. at 536. 
183. Seeid. at 517. 
184. See Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
185. See id. at 354. 
186. See id. at 324. 
187. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
188. See id. at 368. 
189. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
190. See id. at 542. 
191. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
192. See id. at 604. 
193. See id. at 619. 
194. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 ( 2003). 
195. See id. at 563 . 
196. See id. at 578. 
197. See Gall v. United States, 12 8 S. Ct. 586 (2007) . 
198. See id. at 591. 
199. See id. at 592- 93. 
200. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. ofNev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
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Determination that stop and identify statutes do not violate 
Fourth or Fifth Amendments.201 The defendant received a 
$250 fine.202 
• United States v. Wen Ho Lee.203 Scientist at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory was accused of being a spy in a widely 
reported matter.204 After a plea bargain to unlawful retention 
of national defense information, he received a sentence of 
time served while awaiting trial.205 
In each of these cases, a defense lawyer at trial (and prior to it] would 
have been absolutely essential to raise, assert, and preserve highly 
significant and difficult legal issues. Yet, under the Court' s reasoning in 
Scott, no lawyer would be constitutionally required in any ofthem.206 
4. Collateral Consequences of Convictions 
In the American criminal justice system, collateral sanctions207 often 
create persistent and lasting obstacles for a convict long after she has 
supposedly discharged her debt to society. For felons, these consequences 
can severely impinge personal freedoms and civil liberties by causing 
exclusion from federal aid programs/08 disqualification from military 
201. See id. at 189-91. 
202. /d. at 182. 
203. See United States v. Wen Ho Lee, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3082 {lOth Cir. 2000). The 
2000 prosecution is discussed in Neely Tucker, Wen Ho Lee Reporters Held in Contempt, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 19, 2004, at A02, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A 13508-2004Aug 18.html. 
204. See Tucker, supra note 203. 
205. See Joshua Micah Marshall, Wen Ho Lee is Free, SALON, Sept. 13, 2000, available at 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2000/09/ 13/lee/index.htrnl. 
206. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). In fairness, one should note that under 
the later Shelton decision some of the cases- involving suspended sentences- would today 
require counsel. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002). 
207. See REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON 
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (2003), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/ 103A.pdf (stating that the American Bar 
Association defmes "collateral sanction" to conviction as a "legal penalty, disability, or 
disadvantage, however denominated, that is imposed on a person automatically upon that 
person' s conviction for a felony, misdemeanor, or other offense, even if it is n ot included in the 
sentence"). See generally JeiUiy Roberts, The Myth of Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators," 93 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
208. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 862a ( 1997) (certain drug convictions bar felons from "assistance 
under any State program funded under ... the Social Security Act" as well as "benefits under the 
food stamps program . . . or any State program carried out under the food Stamp Act of 1977."). 
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service/09 and disenfranchisement.210 Misdemeanor convictions may seem 
minor.211 However, the collateral consequences of such convictions can 
also lead to serious repercussions, often outweighing the severity of the 
crime and the formal criminal punishment imposed at the original 
sentencing. Four such consequences are especially noteworthy. 
a. Employment 
Persons convicted of misdemeanors can face grave employment 
hurdles that make it difficult to get and keep jobs. This, in turn, creates 
substantial barriers since the inability to sustain credible employment often 
plays a major role in recidivism.212 The mere stigma of a conviction-no 
matter how trivial the crime may be--complicates the hiring process.213 
Due in part to the advent of speedy internet search engines, and the 
popularity and availability of ·private background screening searches/14 
employers have easy access to information regarding a job applicant's 
criminal background.215 Further, these screening services go virtually 
209. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 504 (''No person who ... has been convicted of a felony may be 
enlisted in any armed force."). 
210. See ACLU Drug Policy Rehabilitation Project, Collateral Consequences of the War on 
Drugs, Jan. 2003, at 3, http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/final%20brochure.pdf (noting that, while 
felony disenfranchisement laws vary from state to state, only Vermont and Maine have no voting 
restrictions for convicted felons). 
211. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (2008). In California, for instance, a misdemeanor "is 
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding 
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both." !d. That is a fairly typical approach. 
212. Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid, ABA CRIM. JUST., Fall2006, 
at 17. For more information regarding the role employment restrictions can play, see Joan 
Petersilia, WHEN PRlSONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRlSONER REENTRY {2003) (stating that 
prisoners will have a difficult time finding employment after their release); Pierre, Ex-Offenders 
Protest Death of Jobs, Services, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at B04, available at 
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/01 r AR2008070 1 02608_pf.html 
(stating that "the unemployment rate for ex-offenders is as high as 50 percent"). This article well 
describes the painful application process ex-offenders face. !d. 
213. See Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and 
Imprisonment for Sustainable Communities and the Environment, 28 WM. & MARY ENVT'L L. & 
POL'Y REv. 423, 425-42 (2004). 
214. See, e.g., Minnesota Criminal Background Check, http://www.mncriminals.com 
(advertising "totally free criminal background checks"); see also Abika, 
http://www.abika.com/Reports!Freebackgroundchecksandverifications.htm (advertising "Free 
Background checks, address checks, court record searches and verifications"); 
BackgroundCheckGateway, 
http://www.backgroundcheckgateway.com/public-records.html (promoting "free instant 
background checks"); AAA Infosystems.com, 
http://www.aaainfosystems.com (advertising "Background Checks- Free Online Information 
Resources"). 
215. See Love, supra note 212, at 17. 
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unregulated, opening more doors for misuse and abuse of criminal history 
in the employment process.216 Federal law does not protect convicted 
misdemeanants from employment discrimination,217 and most states do not 
either. Some states do take individual action to limit employment practices 
that result· in unfair bias based upon convictions.218 For example, 
Wisconsin219 and New York220 prohibit blanket disqualification of job 
applicants based on criminal convictions.221 
Misdemeanor convictions may also have repercussions for 
professional licensing. Many licensing applications require full disclosure 
of all prior convictions. They often note, though, that misdemeanor 
convictions will only be one consideration in the overall decision to grant a 
professional license.222 In some professions, such as law enforcement, 
applications set a limit for the degree of misdemeanor that will trigger 
216. See id. 
217. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l ). Title VII of the U.S. Code is silent on this point. Td. 
Consider this: 
/d. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otheiWise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priv ileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
218. See Brisman, supra note 213, at 437-40. 
219. WIS. STAT. § 111.321 ("[N)o employer, labor organization, employment agency, 
licensing agency or other person may engage in any act of employment discrimination . . . against 
any individual on the basis of age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex, national 
origin, ancestry, arrest record, conviction record ... "). 
220. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW§ 752 states: 
No application for any license or employment, and no employment or license held by 
an individual, to which the provisions of this article are applicable, shall be denied or 
acted upon adversely by reason of the individual's having been previously convicted 
of one or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of 'good moral 
character' when such finding is based upon the fact that the individual has previously 
been convicted of one or more criminal offenses. 
221. See supra notes 219 and 220 (showing that the statutes in both Wisconsin and New York 
allow consideration of criminal background if a substantial relalionship exists between the 
conviction and job at issue). 
222. See. e.g., Rules for the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, 
http://www.vbbe.state.va.us/pdf7VBBERules.pdf (explaining that, while "commission or 
conviction of a crime" may be ground for denial of the right to practice law in the state of 
Virginia, the Board considers factors such as "seriousness of the conduct" and "candor of the 
applicant in the admissions process"); see Statutes and Regulations: Social Workers, Dep't of 
Commerce, Community, and Economics Development, State of Alaska, at 7 (June 2006); 
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 18.140c, available at 
http://www.dced.state.ak.us/occ/pub/SocialWorkStatutes.pdf {hereinafter Statutes and 
Regulations) ("The board will, in its discretion, deny an application for a license under AS 
08.95.110 if the board fmds that the applicant's history of felony or misdemeanor convictions 
make the applicant unfit for the license."). 
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denial of a license or disciplinary proceedings for licensed professionals.223 
Sometimes the nature of the crime or conviction must bear a direct 
relationship to the particular skills or requirements of the profession to 
incur a penalty.224 For instance, under federal law, doctors may have their 
ability to prescribe medications revoked if convicted of "any ... law of the 
United States, or of any State, relating to any substance defined ... as a 
controlled substance or a list I chemical;"225 also, "a misdemeanor 
conviction for possession of burglar's tools bars licensure as a locksmith" 
in New York.226 Therefore, while a hiring or licensing process might not 
categorically exclude those convicted of minor crimes, such convictions-
wholly apart from their sentences-may allow for exclusion.227 Moreover, 
while misdemeanor convictions do not carry the weight of a felony 
conviction for professional licensing purposes,228 those convicted of a 
misdemeanor may well face an uphill battle when seeking such licensing. 
223. See, e.g., Police Officer Supplemental Questionnaire, City of Savage, available, 
http:l/www.ci.savage.mn.us!DepartmentsAndServices!Adrninistrarion/documents/PoliceOfficer-
2007-Supplement.pdf (stating that "[b]eing convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor in 
[Minnesota]" constitutes grounds for discipline of licensed officers); see Procedure for 
QualifYing Applicants for Employment as Peace Officers, The University of Texas Systems, 
http://www.utsystem.edu/pol/application.htm (applicants may not have been convicted of "any 
criminal offense above the grade of Class B misdemeanor or a Class B misdemeanor within the 
last ten years from the date of the court order"). 
224. See, e.g., Misdemeanor/Felony Conviction Form, Michigan State Board of Education, 
http://www.umtlint.edu/graduateprograms/documents/MisdemeanorFelonyConvictionForrn.pdf 
("Conviction, as an adult, of an act of immoral conduct contributing to the delinquency of a child, 
or of a felony involving moral turpitude" may lead to refusal to grant a teach er certification or 
revocation or suspension of a previously granted license); see Statutes and Regulations, supra 
note 222 (a licensed social worker may be disciplined if he "has been convicted of a felony or has 
been convicted of a misdemeanor that reflects on the licensee's abiliry to practice competently 
and professionally"). 
225. 21 U.S.C.A. § 824(a)(2). Thus, a minor drug conviction may adversely impact a licensed 
doctor's medical practice if she is prohibited from prescribing or distributing controlled 
medications to patients. 
226. Legal Action Center, Setting the Record Straight: What DejellSe Attorneys Need to Know 
About the Civil Consequences of Client Criminal Records, at 8 (2001), 
http://www.hirenetwork.org/pdfslsetting_the_record_straight.pdf. 
227. See id. 
228. See Gruson, Convict-Turned-Doctor Provoke~- Penl1.lylvunia License Battle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 1985, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501 E6DE I 73BF93BA357 51 C I A963 948260&s 
ec=health&spon=&pagewanted=l (a state board in Pennsylvania improperly denied a convict-
turned-doctor's application for a license to practice medicine based on a misdemeanor, rather than 
felony, conviction). 
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b. Education 
Misdemeanor convictions can complicate access to educational 
opportunities, particularly for those whose convictions involve drug use or 
possession. Any student convicted of "any offense under any Federal or 
State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance for 
conduct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student 
was receiving any grant, loan, or work assistance ... " will not be eligible 
to receive future assistance for a period of years determined by the nature 
of the conviction.229 Question 35 of the Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid ("F AFSA") requires applicants to disclose any prior drug 
convictions;230 applicants who answer in the affirmative or fail to answer at 
all will automatically be denied financial aid.231 Students may resume 
eligibility prior to the completion of their suspension through a 
rehabilitation program, 232 nonetheless, the ability to finance education 
could well be compromised. 
It is not simply fundipg for academic activities which is adversely 
affected by criminal convictions. For students with misdemeanor 
convictions, gaining admission to institutions of higher learning can pose a 
challenge. In the wake of the Virginia Tech shootings, colleges and 
universities are now taking a closer look at applicants' criminal records in 
an effort to avoid admitting students who might cause trouble at their 
institutions. 233 In 2007, the Common Application, an application form used 
by approximately 320 schools, was changed to require disclosure of 
misdemeanor and felony convictions234 This change was spurred by the 
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2008). Possession of controlled substances offenses bars the 
person from receiving aid for one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense, and 
indeflllitely for a third offense. § 109!(r)(l). Sale of controlled substances offense bars the 
person from receiving aid for 2 years for a first offense, and indefinitely for a second offense. § 
109l(r)(l). Challenges to the statute have been wholly unsuccessful. See Students for Sensible 
Drug Policy Found. v. Spellings, 523 F.3d 896, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2008) (indicating the most 
recent example of a futile statutory challenge). 
230. See Collateral Consequences of the War on Drugs, supra note 21 0, at 1. 
231. Id. "Since 2000, 87,637 students have been denied aid under this act." Id. 
232. 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (r)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2008). The statute provides: 
A student whose eligibility has been suspended under paragraph (1) may resume 
eligibility before the end of the ineligibility period determined under such paragraph 
if ... (A) the student satisfactorily completes a drug rehabilitation program that-(i) 
complies with such criteria as the Secretary shall prescribe in regulations for purposes 
of this paragraph; and (ii) includes two unannounced drug tests .. . . 
§ 1091 (r)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). 
233. Marc Fischer, Cho: How'd He Get Into Virginia Tech?, WASH. POST, Apr. 23,2007, 
http:/lvoices.washingtonpost.cornlrawfisher/2007/04/cho_howd_he_get_into_virginia.html. 
234. See The Common Application Inc., 2008-09 First-Year Application, 
https://www.commonapp.org/CommonApp/docs/doMlloadfonns/CommonApp2008.pdf {last 
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realization that when given the choice between using a college's official 
application form or the Common Application, students with discipline 
problems were using the Common Application because it did not ask about 
such conduct. 235 
Although there does not seem to be an official policy stating that 
misdemeanor convictions will result in the automatic rejection of an 
admission candidate, in deciding whether to admit the student, schools 
appear to take a hard look at any applicant convicted of a crime.236 With 
record numbers of students applying to colleges,237 admissions officers are 
visited Oct. 27, 2008); Laura Pappano, Conduct Unbecoming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,2007, 
http://www.nytimes.comf2007/04/22/education/pappano.htrnl?partner=permalink&exprod=penna 
link. 
235. Pappano, supra note 234. 
236. This close scrutiny is all too familiar for one-time University of Maryland basketball 
recruit Tyree Evans. See Luke Winn, College Basketball, COLLEGE BASKETBALL SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, June 5, 2006, at 78. Plagued by criminal charges, Evans had already been denied 
the chance to play for at least two universities. See Jeff Barker & Don Markus, Evans Not a Terp 
Yet; Maryland Reviewing Admission of Recruit With Troubled Past; Men 's Basketball, 
BALTIMORE SUN, May 8, 2008, at 11-Z. Evans eventually pled guilty to two misdemeanors; the 
first for marijuana possession and the second for assault and battery. !d. In April 2008, Evans 
signed with the Terrapins and was thrilled with the school for "[g]iving [him] a shot . .. . " See 
Luke Winn, Maryland Takes a Risk on a Talented Player With a Troubled Past, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, May 5, 2008, 
http:// sportsillustrated.~nn.comf2 008/writers/luke _ winn/0 5/05/evans.mary landlindex.html. 
Though Evans had the full support of the Maryland basketball coach, who intended to mentor 
Evans, the recruit could not be admitted to the university without facing a review by the Office of 
Student Conduct. See Barker & Markus, supra note 236, at 11-Z. Before the Office of Student 
Conduct even considered Evan's convictions, Evans asked for, and was granted, release from his 
letter of intent. See Jeff Barker, Evans Won't Attend UM; Terps Accept Controversial Recruit's 
Request to be Released From Commitment; Men's Basketball, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 2008, 
at 3-Z. See generally Eric Prisbell, Troubled Basketball Recruit Evans Won't Play for Terps 
After All, WASH. POST, May 24,2008, 
http://www. washingtonpost.comfwp-dyn/content/artide/2008/05/23/ AR2008052302 7 45 .html, for 
good overviews of the matter. The University of Maryland 's policy is that "All Maryland 
applicants, including non[-]athletes, must be reviewed by the Office of Student Discipline if they 
have been found guilty of any violation of the law." See Barker, supra note 236, at 3-Z. 
237. See Pappano, supra note 234; Nick Perry, University of Washington Rejects a Record 
Number of Applications, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18,2008, 
http ://seattletimes.nwsource.comfhtml/education/2004422043_ acceptance 18m.hnnl (reporting 
that "[a]pplications are up 12 percent at Washington State University this year and up 7 percent at 
Western Washington University. Applications to Seattle University hit 5,000 for the first time, 
and just 65 percent of those students were accepted."); Karen W. Arenson, Applications to 
Colleges are Breaking Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2008, 
http://www.nytimes.comf2008/01117/educationll7admissions.html (stating "Harvard said 
Wednesday that it had received a record number of applicants- 27,278- for its next freshman 
class, a 19 percent increase over last year. Other campuses reporting double-digit increases 
included the University of Chicago (18 percent), Amherst College (17 percent), Northwestern 
University (14 percent) and Dartmouth (10 percent)."); California State University, California 
Receives Record Number of Applications for Fall2008, Feb. 1, 2008, 
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now looking at criteria beyond just grade point averages and standardized 
test scores to determine which applicants will receive acceptance letters. 
According to the dean of admissions for Syracuse University, the selection 
process "isn't any longer about admitting students who would be successful 
and denying those who wouldn't. It is moving into an area of selecting 
people who will bring something to your campus and contribute."238 For 
students with misdemeanor convictions, this new trend in the admissions 
criteria can certainly limit-or seem to limit-the field of potential 
colleges.239 One Oregon teenager had a stellar academic record, but also a 
conviction for shoplifting a shirt. 240 He wondered if it was even "worth it 
to apply[,]" to schools inquiring about criminal misconduct.241 At the time 
he was interviewed, the teen said that he had "only applied to universities 
that do not ask about such issues and he [was) hesitant to apply to those 
that do."242 
The issues raised by minor convictions can also surface later. Indeed, 
students convicted of crimes are often surprised to learn that their schools 
have policies which support punishment of criminal conduct in addition to 
court sanctions,243 even for crimes which did not occur on school 
property.244 Student conduct policies often include broad language 
http://www.calstate.edu/pa/news/2008/Record_Number_Underg:raduate.shtml (providmg "The 
California State University has received a record 515,448 undergraduate applications for fall 2008 
admissions as of January 29. This represents an increase of 47,967 applications received to date 
from the same time period last year."). As stated in a recent Kansas City newspaper article: 
Enrollments have grown at many colleges and universities during the last decade as 
baby boomers' children graduated high school, national experts say. But this year 
may be a bumper crop for public institutions across the country, with record freslunan 
classes predicted from San Diego State University in the west to Virginia Tech in the 
east. 
See Mara Rose Williams, Freshmen Flock to Univer.~ilies, KANSAS Cnv STAR (Mo.), June 3, 
2008, at A-I. 
238. Pappano, supra note 234. 
239. See Larry Gordon, Does a Pot Bust Trump a 4.0 CPA?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, 
http :l/www.latimes.cornlnews/educationlla-me-admit5dec05, I, 1651158. story?coll=la-ncws-
leaming. 
240. ld. 
241. /d. 
242. Id. 
243. See, e .g., University of Colorado Office of Judicial Affairs, The Most Frequently Asked 
Questions by Students About Judicial Affoirs, 
http :l/www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/student-faq.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2007). The University of Colorado website explains to students that being charged in court or 
being referred to judicial affairs for additional discipline is not double jeopardy. ld. "As a 
student, you are held responsible by the university for your behavior under the Student Conduct 
Code, rather than criminal statutes." /d. 
244. See, e.g., The University of Virginia, Good Neighbor Guide (2006), 
http://www.virginia.edu/comrnunityre lations/off_grounds_guide.pdf (explaining that students 
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regarding what degrees of off-campus criminal misconduct will result in 
disciplinary action by the school. For example, the Western State College 
of Colorado Policy Regarding Off-Campus states: 
[A) student's behavior in the larger community may be grounds for 
misconduct action, provided that the behavior could have serious 
adverse impact on the college community. The College believes that 
all students are responsible for obeying federal, state, and municipal 
laws; violation of these laws can lead to misconduct action by the 
college.245 
In order to enforce these policies punishing crimes committed off-
campus, schools work with other academic institutions and state agencies 
to stay informed of instances of such student misconduct.246 Going one 
step further, some schools require students to report themselves to the 
Office of the Dean of Students in the event of "[a]ny arrests or convictions 
for violation of federal, state, local, or international law ... . "241 A 
living off campus are still subject to the University Judiciary Committee for any violation of 
federal, state, or local law); see also Kara Rowland & Whitney Garrison, Eight Students. Seven 
Others Arrested in Drug Bust, THE CAVALIER DAILY, Oct. 6, 2003, 
http://www.cavalierdaily.com/news/2003/oct/06/eight-studc;nts-seven-others·arrested-in-drug-
bust/ (adding that University of Virginia students involved in drug trafficking, if convicted, could 
face charges for violating the University's standard code of conduct). 
245. See Western State College of Colorado, Institutional Security Policies & Crime Statistics 
(2008), http://www.westem.edulstudaff!handbooklcrime~report.html (last visited on Oct. 27, 
2008). 
246. See, e.g., Virginia Tech, University Policies for Studeru Life§ 3A, 
http://www.judicial.vt.edu/upsl.php#jurisdiction; see also Colorado University, Ralphie's Guide 
to Student Life; Safety, http://www.colorado.edu/ralphie/ralphie.cgi?file=s/safety.html (last visited 
on Oct. 27, 2008). The Virginia Tech University policy explains: 
!d. 
University detectives coordinate with the district or city attorney's offices for the 
filing of criminal charges. Cases involving students also are referred to the Office of 
Judicial Affairs for review and possible university sanctions. UPD crime reports 
containing information that might affect the security of other university units are 
routed to those units and appropriate administrators. 
247. See University ofVirginia, Non-Academic Regulations, 
http://records.ureg.virginia.edufcontent.php?catoid=7&page9l8b_non_academic_regulations.htm 
I (last visited on Oct. 27, 2008). Other schools have similar self-reporting policies. See 
Greenville Technical College Health Science/Nursing Division, Criminal Background Check 
Policy (July 14, 2006), 
. http://www.gvltec.edu/academics/hcalth_nursing!CRIMINAL_BACKGROUNDCHECK.POLIC 
Y0706.pd[ Greenville Technical College in South Carolina requires students in the Healthcare 
Science/Nursing Division to "[r]eport within 3 calendar days to the Assistant Dean of Health 
Science/Nursing any arrests and/or criminal charges or convictions filed subsequent to the 
completion of the crirninal background check. Failure to report will make the student subject to 
administrative withdrawal from the program." Jd. Troy University's School of Nursing, in 
Alabama, has a similar disclosure policy which requires students to: 
[R]eport any arrests or legal convictions including, but not limited to, misdemeanors, 
felonies, sexual offender convictions or governmental sanctions .. .. Failure to report 
arrests or legal convictions will result in dismissal from the School of Nursing ... . 
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student's failure to report an arrest or conviction could lead to further 
discipline by the University, should the misconduct come to the attention of 
school administrators. 248 
Student conduct policies allowing for punishment of crimes 
committed off-campus are not empty threats. Schools can, and do, sanction 
students for these crimes. In a move that garnered much attention, and 
ultimately resulted in various lawsuits, the University of Virginia took 
action against three students for assaulting another student off campus, in 
the Charlottesville area. 249 The three students who all pled guilty or no 
contest to criminal charges, were convicted of misdemeanors. 250 After the 
court proceedings, the University imposed its own additional sanctions and 
suspended all three students (with one student's suspension for two full 
years) and required that two of the students complete seventy-five hours of 
community service and the other student complete I 00 hours of community 
service. m 
Not surprisingly, institutions are particularly concerned with 
violations of the law involving alcohol and drugs. 252 Here is Virginia 
At such tLIDe a nursing student is arrested, the student has 24 hours to report this arrest 
to the appropriate Program Director. Failure to report the arrest will result in 
automatic dismissal from the School of Nursing. 
Troy University College of Health and Human Services, School of Nursing, Disclosure of Legal 
Convictions and Arrests (2005), 
http://troy.troy.edu/nursing/pdti'BSNorientation.pdf. At the University of Miami, students 
employed as part of the Federal Work Study program have the responsibility to disclose to their 
employer any arrests or convictions occurring after their date of hire. See University of Miami 
Office of Student Employment, Employment Practices and Procedures Manual, 
http:/ /www6.miami.edu!UMH/CDA!UMH_Main/ 0, 1770, 13439-1; 1344 7 -2;24490-3 ,OO.html (last 
visited on Oct. 27, 2008). "Upon this disclosure, or if the University discovers an arrest or 
conviction has occurred, the employer may take action as it deems necessary to protect the 
University community, which may include suspension of the student-employee pending further 
review or immediate termination." /d. 
248. ld. (indicating that before a review is conducted by the police or University officials, 
there may be action taken by the hiring department). 
249. See Maria Tor, Judge Throws Out Part ofTigretl Suit, THE CAVALIER DAILY, June 15, 
2000, available at http:f/www.cavalierdaily.com/CV Article.asp?ID=4560&pid=583; Tigrett v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 290 F.3d 620,621-22 (4th Cir. 2002). 
250. See John Clark, Kory May Sue Smith, Kintz, Tigrett for Personal Injury, THE CAVALIER 
DAILY, Nov. 17, 1999, available at 
http://www.cavalierdaily.com/CV Article.asp?ID=2205&pid=506. One of the students was 
sentenced to 12 months in jail with all but 10 days suspended, while the other two received a 
sentence of 30 days with all but eight days suspended. Jacqueline Roper, University to Begin 
Defense Against Smith Lawsuit Today, THE CAVALIER DAILY, Apr. 25, 2008, available at 
http://cavalierdaily.student.virginia.edu/CVArticle.asp?ID=5962&pid=633 (listing the 
suspensions). 
25 L See Rector, supra note 249 at 625. 
252. The University of Oklahoma, Student Alcohol Policy, 
https:/lwebapps.ou.edulalcohollpolicy.cfin.; 
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Tech's policy regarding criminal activity occurring off-campus: 
Disciplinary action may be taken by the university for any act 
constituting a violation of the law when the act is contrary to the 
university's interests as an academic community .... The university 
is especially concerned about high-risk consumption of alcohol and 
other drug use which threatens the lives, health, safety, and academic 
success of our students and has deemed off-campus violations of the 
alcoholic beverage and illegal drug policies to be actionable in the 
university judicial system.253 
181 
To further its goal of preventing alcohol and drug abuse, Virginia 
Tech, punishes, for example, students convicted of driving under the 
influence (DUI).254 Generally, when students with no prior alcohol-related 
offenses are convicted of DUI offenses, they are given deferred 
suspensions from school and must take part in an "educational experience" 
designed to teach the students responsible decision making.255 When 
students with prior alcohol-related offenses are convicted of a DUI, they 
are typically suspended from Virginia Tech and must take part in an 
educational experience upon their return to campus, wholly part from any 
punishment from the criminal justice system.256 
!d. 
For students who are convicted of crimes, the range of sanctions a 
[A}ll students who are currently enrolled at the University of Oklahoma or are pre-
enrolled for subsequent semesters and have either attended the institution for at least 
one semester in the current or past academic year are responsible for following 
federal, state and local laws, the Student Code of Responsibilities and Conduct, and 
the Student Alcohol Policy . . . . To curtail alcohol abuse on and off campus, the 
university has adopted a mandatory, minimum "3 Strikes" policy. The first alcohol 
violation, whether off campus or on campus, automatically will result in appropriate 
parent/guardian notification and further alcohol education. A second offense will also 
automatically carry parent/guardian notification and an appropriate sanction. A third 
violation will result in automatic suspension from the university for a minimum of 
one semester. 
253. See Virginia Tech, University Policies for Student Life § 3A, 
http://www.judicial.vt.edu/upsl.php; see also Eastern Washington University, Alcohol Policy, 
http://www.ewu.edu/x4333.xml, is similar: 
/d. 
The purpose of this policy is to further the university mission by creating a safe 
environment for student learning. To accomplish this, the university will support the 
enforcement of federal, state, and local laws, as well as its own alcohol and drug 
policies and procedures .... Eastern Washington University . . . complies with and 
upholds all federal, state, and local laws that regulate or prohibit the possession, use, 
or distribution of alcohol. Violations of such laws that come to the attention of 
university officials will be addressed within the university or through prosecution in 
the courts, or both. 
254. See Virginia Tech, Judicial Affairs, Sanction Information, 
http:f/www .judicial. vt.edulsanctionrange.php. 
255. See id_ 
256. See id. 
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school can impose on a student is generally vast, from formal warnings to 
permanent expulsion.257 Though penalties such as suspension and 
expulsion are particularly disturbing to a student's daily life, any 
disciplinary action can affect a student for years to come as he or she 
applies to graduate schools and attempts to become a member of a 
professional organization.25s 
c. Housing 
The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 gives 
public housing authorities the right to access criminal files of an applicant 
or tenant, and also records from drug treatment facilities. 259 The purpose of 
the law is to assist authorities in deciding whether the applicant is currently 
engaging in illegal use of a controlled substance. 260 While this information 
must be kept confidential/61 applicants with misdemeanor convictions 
could face serious consequences in the housing application process. In 
many places, the housing authority has the discretion to deny admission to 
applicants if they-or members of family-have been convicted of certain 
misdemeanors such as those involving drug use. 262 Federal law is quite 
specific, denying applications if: 
[A]ny member· of the applicant's household is or was, during a 
reasonable time preceding the date when the applicant household 
would otherwise be selected for admission, engaged in any drug-
related or violent criminal activity or other criminal activity which 
would adversely affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises by other residents, the owner, or public 
housing agency employees.263 
257. See id. 
258. See, e.g., William and Mary Law School, Application for Admission, 
http://www.law.wm.cdu/law/documents/jd_application07.pdf (asking law school applicants 
whether they have been subject to disciplinary action for scholastic or other reasons in any of the 
colleges, universities, graduate or professional schools they have attended); see also Virginia 
Board of Bar Examiners, Applicant's Character and Fitness Questionnaire 7, 
http ://www. vbbe.state. va.us/pdf/LRC&FQuestion.pdf (requiring Virginia State Bar applicantS to 
indicate whether they have ever been disciplined by a college, university, or any other post-high 
school educational facility). 
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(s) (2006). The National Crime Information Center, police 
departments, and other law enforcement agencies must provide conviction materials for 
"purposes of applicant screening, lease enforcement, and eviction." §1437d {q)( l)(A). 
260. See § 1437d (t)(i). 
26 1. St?e § 1437d (t)(2). 
262. 42 u.s.c. § 13662 (1999). 
263. See 42 U.S.C. § l366l(c) (1999). For public housing purposes, "drug-related criminal 
activity means the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or possession with intent to 
manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(9) (2006). 
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Further, once a tenant resides in public housing, a misdemeanor 
committed even by others can interfere with the tenant's ability to remain 
there. 264 In 2002, the Supreme Court held that local public housing 
authorities have the right to terminate tenants whose guests or family 
members engage in substance abuse/65 whether or not the tenant knew or 
had reason to know about the activity.266 This "one-strike" policy can lead 
to evictions for even minor cases of drug-related activity, as in numerous 
instances in which tenants were evicted because family members smoked 
marijuana in an apartment complex parking lot.267 Although under 
California law, possession of "not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, 
other than concentrated cannabis" constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by 
a maximum $100 fine,268 the relatives of the criminals faced eviction in the 
case.269 These harsh penalties exist not only for drug offenses, but for any 
other criminal offense that "threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants", whether the offense occurs on 
or off the premises, with or without the tenant's knowledge.m 
Once a tenant has been evicted from public housing for a drug-related 
crime, including a misdemeanor such as possession of marijuana, she "shall 
not be eligible for federally assisted housing during the 3-year period 
beginning on the date of such eviction" unless she completes an approved 
rehabilitation program.271 Clearly, misdemeanor crimes can have dire 
effects on assisted housing, both presently and in the future, even if the 
actual tenant on the property did not commit the crime. 272 
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a)(l) (1999). 
265. See Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 115, 136 
(2002). 
266. See id. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act "'requires lease tenns that give local public housing 
authorities the discretion to tenninate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a 
guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have 
known, of the dmg·rclated activity." Jd. 
267. Jd. at 128. 
268. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ l1357(b) (2008). 
269. See Rucker, supra note 265 at 128. 
270. 42 u.s.c. § l437d(k) (2006). 
271. See 42 U.S.C. § l3661(a) (1999). 
272. Other areas are affected too, such as parental rights. See generally N.Y. SOCIAL 
SERVICES LAW § 378-a (McKinney 2007) (explaining a misdemeanor conviction may also affect 
the parental rights of the offender. In some states, a conviction for any crime of a prospective 
foster or adoptive parent--or any individual residing with the prospective parent-may result in a 
denial for the foster or adoptive application). Upon a finding of a criminal record for a certified 
foster parent, potential adoptive parent, or resident with either, the "authorized agency shall 
perfonn a safety assessment of the conditions in the household ... [and) shall thereafter take all 
appropriate steps to protect the health and safety of such child or children, including, when 
appropriate, the removal of any foster child or children from the home." § 378-a. Although the 
authority to deny foster or adoptive applications for misdemeanor convictions is discretionary for 
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d. Immigration Proceedings 
Problems for non-U.S. citizens convicted of minor crimes may even 
be greater. These people may be removed from the cmmtry, or deemed 
"inadmissible" for immigration purposes.213 The commission of crimes 
involving moral turpitude ("CIMT") always renders an alien 
inadmissible. 274 An evaluation of moral turpitude does not hinge on the 
severity of the crime-or even its punishment-but rather the intent of the 
criminal in committing the offense.275 A crime involving specific intent, 
such as larceny,276 constitutes a CTMT; however, in some cases, 
aggravating factors may elevate a non·CIMT to a CIMT.277 Moral 
turpitude is determined by the statutory definition of the crime and not the 
facts underlying the conviction.278 
There are two important exceptions to removability due to 
commission of a CIMT. First, if the individual committed the CIMT while 
the authorized agency, nonetheless a misdemeanor conviction may expose potential parents to 
serious familial repercussions. See§ 378-a 2(h). 
273. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (2)(A)(l) (showing that Under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act § 240, conviction includes a "formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court" or any 
adjudication in which "a judge or jury has found the alien guilty[,] . . . the alien has entered a plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere[,] or [the alien] has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a fmding of 
guilt" and "some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty" has been 
imposed). Preston, Perfectly Legal Immigrants, Until They Applied for Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/us/12naturalize.html?hp 
(showing the strikingly more severe consequences here being seen in recent years). She recounts 
the story of one legal immigrant-an electrical engineer living in the U.S. for almost two 
decades-who "discovered that a 10-year-old conviction for domestic violence involving a 
former girlfriend, even though it had been reduced to a misdemeanor and erased from his public 
record, made him ineligible to become a citizen--or even to continue living in the United States." 
!d. 
274. See 8 U.S.C.A. § ll82(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) . This includes convictions ofCIMTs, admission to 
convictions of CIMTs, as well as commission of acts which have the same "essential elements" of 
a CIMT. [d. The definition does not extend, however, to "purely political offense[s]." ld. See 
generally Vargas-Padilla, immigration Consequences of Criminal Conduct, III CRIM. LAW BRIEF 
(American University 2007), at 24, available at 
http://www. wcl.american.edu/joumal/clb/issues.cfin. 
275. See id. 
276. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL NOTES 40.2 l(A) N2. MORAL 
TURPITUDE (2005) [hereinafter F AM], available at 
http://www.state.gov/docurnents/organization/86942.pdf. 
277. See Vargas-Padilla, supra note 274, at 26 ("assault and battery with a deadly weapon has 
long been deemed a crime involving moral turpitude, because the knowing or attempted use of 
deadly force is deemed an act of moral depravity that takes the offense outside the 'simple assault 
and battery' categoJY."). 
278. See FAM, supra note 276. This "categorical approach" allows for the divisibility o f the 
statute of conviction provided that the statute combines both CIMTs and non-CIMTs in a single 
code section. See also Vargas-Padilla, supra note 274 (depicting the process of removal and 
conviction). 
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underage, it will not be used to remove him. 279 Second, if the crime is 
deemed a "petty offense," then it will not serve as a basis for removal.280 A 
"petty offense" means the potential imprisonment for a conviction does not 
exceed one year and the actual sentence imposed does not exceed six 
months.281 However, any conviction "relating to a controlled substance" 
renders an alien automatically inadmissible regardless of sentence.282 The 
statute broadly encompasses a wide array of drug offenses and 
convictions.283 The statutory exception excludes convictions for "a single 
offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana."284 Courts generally construe this exception narrowly.285 
Aggravated felony convictions also serve as a means for deportability or 
removal, which can include misdemeanor convictions analogous to federal 
felonies-enumerated in 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(2}-under drug trafficking 
laws.286 However, the state drug conviction must be punishable as a federal 
felony to substantiate removal.287 Therefore, some misdemeanor 
convictions may not qualify?88 
279. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The automatic C!MT exclusion does not apply if: 
(T]he crime was commined when the alien was under 18 yeal'l> of age, and the crime 
was committed (and the alien released from any confinement to a prison or 
correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of 
application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission 
to the United States. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
280. See Vargas-Pad.illa, supra note 274, at 26. 
281. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). The automatic CIMT exclusion does not apply if: 
[t]he maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or 
which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits 
having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for 
one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the 
sentence was ultimately executed). 
§ 1182(a){2)(A)(ii)(II). 
282. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2){A)(i)(II), 
283. See, e.g., Matter of Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I&N Dec. 613 (BIA 1988) (stating that 
respondent was deportable for two convictions for use of phencyclidine, commonly known as 
"PCP"). 
284. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
285. See, e.g., Matter of Moncada-Servellon, 24 I&N Dec. 62, 62-68 (BIA 2007) (finding that 
the exception did not apply to an alien "convicted under a statute that has an element requiring 
that possession of the marijuana be in a prison or other correctional setting"). 
286. See Vargas-Padilla, supra note 274, at 26. 
287. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 51 (2006) (finding that, since the defendant's state 
offense would not be punishable under the federal system, it would not be a sufficient basis for 
removal). 
28 8. Many defendants have raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel with cases in 
which the defense attorney failed to warn of potentially serious immigration consequences 
resulting from pleas to even minor charges. These claims have not been successful. See United 
States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9'h Cir. 2003) (stating that most courts conclude that 
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This chart, prepared by my colleague, Angela Banks, may be useful in 
seeing the range of offenses subject to sanction. 
INADMISSIBLE DEPORTABLE 
GROUNDS GROUNDS 
Crimes involving INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) 
moral turpitude Conviction of, admission Conviction of a crime 
(CIMT) of, or admission of acts involving moral 
constituting a crime turpitude within 5 years 
involving moral after the date of 
turpitude admission & sentence 
of one year or more 
may be imposed. 
CIMTyouth INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) 
exception 
CIMT petty offense INA§ 
exception 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(Il) 
Controlled substance INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) INA§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i) 
Conviction of, admission Conviction of a 
of, or admission of acts violation of State, U.S., 
constituting a violation or foreign laws relating 
of any law or regulation to a controlled 
of the U.S. or foreign substance 
country relating to a 
controlled substance 
30 gram exception INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) 
for controlled 
substances 
Aggravated felony INA§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
conviction "Any alien who is 
convicted of an 
"deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal process and hence the failure to advise 
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); see also Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 
1251 , 1254 (101~ Cir. 2004) (claim of effective assistance of counsel was denied); State v. 
Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 802 (N.M. 2004) (depicting that the "trial court had no obligation to 
inform defendant of specific consequences of guilty plea"). 
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aggravated felony at 
any time after 
admission is 
deportable." 
Aggravated felony INA§ 10l(a)(43) 
defined 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
In the several areas noted above, misdemeanor convictions can cause 
serious collateral consequences for defendants even when unaccompanied 
at that time by a substantial penalty such as jail time. Recognizing the 
severity and unfairness of these collateral consequences, the American Bar 
Association has attempted to persuade lawmakers to limit col1ateral 
sanctions that significantly infringe on individual liberties and rights.289 
Such limitations include forbidding "deprivation of legally recognized 
domestic relationships and rights other than in accordance with rules 
applicable to the general public,"290 "ineligibility to participate in 
government programs providing necessities of life, including food, 
clothing, housing, medical care, disability pay, and Social Security ... ,"291 
and "ineligibility for governmental benefits relevant to successful reentry 
into society, such as educational and job training programs."292 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It can be vitally important for a poor criminal defendant to have the 
aid of a trained lawyer at a criminal trial, even a trial involving the 
likelihood of little or no serious punishment upon conviction. The 
Supreme Court's limitation of the constitutional right to cases in which 
imprisonment is actually to be imposed made little sense thirty years ago, 
and it makes even less sense today, as more states than ever recognize the 
ongoing problems and do give such legal aid even in minor misdemeanor 
prosecutions. 
289. See ABA STANDARDS fOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISQUALIFlCA TION OF CONVlCfED PERSONS (3d ed. 2003), 
www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/l 03A.pdf. 
290. !d. at STANDARD !9-2.6(c)(i). Conviction alone: 
!d. 
[S)hould be insufficient to deprive a person of the right to contract or dissolve a 
marriage; parental rights, including the right to direct the rearing of children and to 
live with children except during actual confinement; the right to grant or withhold 
consent to the adoption of children; and the right to adopt children . ... 
291. rd. at STANDARD 19-2.6(e). 
292. !d. at STANDARD !9-2.6(f). 
188 ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.2 l 
Justice Powell, in Argersinger, acknowledged that even minor 
misdemeanor prosecutions might wel1 require appointed defense counsel.293 
For him, it was to be a case-by-case determination, not wholly dissimilar 
from that utilized in the deservedly discredited Betts v. Brady special 
circumstances opinion.294 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty offense cases is not 
absolute but is one to be detennined by the trial courts exercising a 
judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. The detennination should 
be made before the accused fonnally pleads [and should be based on 
three considerations]: First, the court should consider the complexity 
of the offense charged. Second, the court should consider the probable 
sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The more serious 
the likely consequence, the greater is the probability that a lawyer 
should be appointed. Third, the court should consider the individual 
factors peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the most 
difficult to anticipate. 295 
No other Justice joined with him there, and for good reason. These 
determinations by a trial judge would be exceedingly difficult to make 
fairly after a trial. Before a trial, they would be just about impossible to 
make with so little known to the judge about the defendant, the nature of 
the case, and the likely punishment. This, of course, is what doomed the 
special circumstances test decades earlier.296 
Some commentators have argued that critics here should become 
realistic. State budgets in this area are not likely to expand much, if at all, 
as a practical matter. Our current system, let alone an extension of the 
counsel right, deprives some defendants in need of real legal aid while it 
gives assistance to those not very much in need. The suggestion here is 
that to comply with Argersinger, states should take actions to be certain 
that truly minor offenses no longer have the possibility of imprisonment, 
thereby eliminating the counsel mandate. One astute observer put the 
matter in this way: 
293. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 27,31 (1972). 
294. !d. at 27. 
295. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 63-{i4. 
296. !d. at 53. Justice Powell himself seemed to recognize the difficulty here: 
!d. 
If counsel is not appointed or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisorunent for any 
duration may be imposed. The judge will therefore be forced to decide in advance of 
trial-and without hearing the evidence-whether he will forgo entirely his judicial 
discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to 
consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature. His altemati ves, 
assuming the availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the 
discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon this discretion in advance and proceed 
without counsel. 
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[l]t makes sense to reallocate resources that otherwise would be spent 
in support of counsel in those cases by eliminating such cases from the 
caseloads of indigent defense counsel, thereby redirecting such 
resources to the support of cases in which the stakes are higher and the 
impact of counsel appears to be greater?97 
189 
This position is intriguing, and clearly more workable than that 
suggested earlier by Justice Powell. For me, however, it is not acceptable 
for two reasons. First, in my view, Scott was wrongly decided and the 
Constitution truly does mandate counsel in all criminal cases. Second, 
there are good reasons to impose the counsel requirement in all criminal 
cases, as indicated above. Even minor cases may become major in later 
years, and may carry dire collateral consequences. Defendants in those 
cases need the guiding hand of trained defense counsel. 
The United States Supreme Court made some bold and highly 
significant judgments regarding the right to an attorney for indigents in 
criminal prosecutions. The decision to limit that right to cases with an 
imprisonment requirement was surely not one of them. The Court should 
revisit the matter and decide that indigent defendants should be given 
appointed counsel in all criminal cases, not just in some criminal cases. 
297. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 496. 
